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ABSTRACT
A MACROECONOMIC APPROACH TO A FIRM'S CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
Mitsuru Katagiri
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde
In this paper, I investigate the logic behind cross sectional dispersion of rm's capital
structure. I incorporate the trade o between tax benets and nancial distress costs
into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms and their endogenous
entry/exit, and compute an equilibrium rm distribution.
The main ndings are summarized as follows. First, I nd that the equilibrium distri-
bution approximates the dispersion of rms' capital structure well. Second, I nd that it
simultaneously accounts for the relationship of capital structure to protability and rm
size. The key mechanisms are the dierence in responses to persistent and transitory pro-
ductivity shocks and economies of scale. Third, I nd through counterfactual experiments
that even if the tax benets do not exist, rms would not signicantly change their capital
structure in contrast to previous works. The intuition is that, with rm's entry/exit, young
rms always exist and use debt until they accumulate internal funding.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many theoretical and empirical works have investigated the logic behind the distribution of
corporate capital structures, which is widespread and stable over time, as one of central re-
search topics in Corporate Finance for a long time. Modigliani and Miller (1958), a seminal
classic paper in capital structure theory, argued that such a dispersion of leverage has noth-
ing to do with rm's optimization. However, numerous empirical works have found that
clear relationships between capital structure and other characteristics of rms such as size
and protability.1 These empirical relationships suggest that rms ultimately choose their
capital structure under some cost-benet analysis. Given these stylized facts, theoretical
works following Modigliani and Miller (1958) have investigated the cross sectional deter-
minants of corporate capital structure. Among others, the dynamic trade o theory, which
1For example, Frank and Goyal (2008) and Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited (1990) discuss the distri-
bution of leverage in the U.S. data. Rajan and Zingales (1995) use G7 countries' cross sectional data and
investigate the cross sectional relationships of corporate capital structure to other corporate characteristics
such as protability and rm size. Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) use the U.S. rm
panel data and obtain similar results. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also uses the U.S. panel data
and emphasizes the xed eect of each rm. Graham and Harvey (2001) collects extensive survey data
from CFOs of the U.S. rms and explore the key determinants of their capital structure decisions.
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describes rms' simultaneous choice of capital structure, investment, and payout under the
trade o between tax benets and nancial distress costs, has succeeded in quantitatively
accounting for the empirical facts.2 While most papers based on the dynamic trade o
theory are very recent and still not well-developed to explain some empirical facts, this
theory is now the most promising one among theoretical models to quantitatively account
for corporate capital structure.
This paper constructs a structural model based on the dynamic trade o theory and
investigate the following quantitative questions which have not been fully investigated by
previous works. First, I examine whether the dynamic trade o theory can induce the
widespread dispersion of corporate capital structure observed in data. I cannot answer
this question by standard dynamic trade o models because most of them are partial equi-
librium models focusing on a certain rm's optimal behavior, and deriving a cross sectional
distribution in equilibrium is outside their scope. In order to overcome this shortcoming,
I extend the model to a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms and
their endogenous entry/exit. By doing so, I obtain not only an optimal policy for each rm,
but also an equilibrium cross sectional distribution regarding rms' characteristics.3 Then
I use the distribution as a natural counterpart of the empirical distribution for comparison.
Second, I examine whether the trade o theory account for the relationship of corporate
2A traditional \static" trade o theory was one of the most popular theories to describe corporate
capital structure, but it was inconsistent with the negative relationship between rms' leverage and their
protability observed in data. That is, according to the theory, protable rms should increase their
leverage because their probability of nancial distress is low and their tax benets are high. Recently,
introducing a dynamic aspect into the trade o theory makes it possible to distinguish the internal equity
from the outside equity and opens the door for the trade o theory to potentially explain the negative
relationship.
3Another way to obtain a cross sectional distribution in a structural model is to generate simulated
data and construct a distribution by the data (e.g., Strebulaev (2007)). This approach does not consider
the distribution itself as an equilibrium, but it is conceptually very similar to the stationary equilibrium
approach in this paper.
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capital structure to rm size and protability. I focus on the relationship with those two
variables because there is little disagreement on the relationships among empirical works.4
In particular, I focus on the following stylized facts about the relationship:
Fact 1 Correlation between protability and rm size is positive
Fact 2 Correlation between leverage and rm size is positive
Fact 3 Correlation between leverage and protability is positive, but it turns out to be
negative if the data is limited to large rms
Fact 4 Correlation between leverage and protability becomes negative after controlling
for rm size.
As far as I know, the structural models to simultaneously account for these stylized facts
do not exist. As potential mechanisms to explain those stylized facts, I incorporate the
following two features into the dynamic trade o model, transitory and persistent idiosyn-
cratic productivities and economies of scale. While these features are common in other
literatures and justied by empirical works, they are not usually incorporated in dynamic
trade o models. In a quantitative part of this paper, I test whether the combination
of those two features and the trade o between tax benets and nancial distress costs
quantitatively account for the stylized facts stated above.
Finally, I measure a relative importance between cross sectional determinants of cor-
porate capital structure. This question sounds a little bit ambitious because this is one of
4In empirical works, a growth expectation measured by the market-to-book ratio is often considered
as one of determinants, but there is no agreement on the sign of their eect on a book leverage among
empirical works. For example, while Fama and French (2002) argues that it is positive, Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) argues that it is negative. Frank and Goyal (2009) shows
the sign of the eect varies over time and concludes that it is not stable over time.
3
the most recurrent questions in the corporate nance literature. I give some answer to this
question through counterfactual experiments. In the experiments, I drop frictions from the
baseline model one by one and recalculate the equilibrium. Then I measure the eect of
the friction on corporate capital structure by comparing the new equilibrium values with
those in the baseline model.
The main ndings of this paper are summarized as follows. First, I nd that the model's
equilibrium distribution accounts for the dispersion of corporate capital structure observed
in the data. In particular, it accounts for the two notable features in data. Many rms
take very low leverage and the distribution is widespread.
Second, I nd that the equilibrium distribution also accounts for the stylized facts
regarding the relationship of capital structure to rm size and protability. In particular,
it accounts for the four stylized facts stated above. The logic behind the result in the model
is as follows. Fact 1 is induced just by the economies of scale. Fact 2 emerges in the model
as a kind of spurious correlation. It is induced by the fact that rms with high persistent
productivity get large and increase their leverage simultaneously. In the model, rms with
high persistent productivity increase their leverage because, rst, they invest more and
expand their nancing decit and, second, the debt market is more accessible to them
under the \trade o." The rst part of Fact 3 is induced by the combination of Fact1 and
Fact2. To understand the logic behind the second part of Fact 3, the key mechanism is the
dierence between responses to the persistent and transitory productivity shock. Firms
with a high persistent productivity increase their leverage as I explained above, but rms
with a high transitory productivity decrease their leverage because their internal funding
increases. Because the economies of scale caused by the xed cost is not relevant for
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large rms, only the latter negative eect remains when I measure the correlation between
leverage and protability using only large rm data. Similarly, Fact 4 is interpreted as
follows: When I add rm size as another explanatory variable in addition to protability,
the rm size controls for the eect of the persistent productivity because rms with high
persistent productivity get large. Thus, the protability in the regression just captures the
eect of transitory productivity, and have a negative eect on leverage.
Finally, I discover the following implications about relative importance between deter-
minants of capital structure through counterfactual experiments. First, even if the tax
benet does not exist, the aggregate and average leverage would not signicantly change.
This is in contrast to previous works. This contrast stems from the dierence in the
assumptions about rms' entry/exit. That is, without rms' entry/exit as a standard dy-
namic trade o model, all rms would eventually use 100% equity by accumulating their
retained earnings when the tax benet does not exist; but with rms' entry/exit, young
rms always exist and use debt in the process of accumulating their retained earnings. This
result implies that the wedge in equity funding caused by the dividend tax and the otation
cost of equity are also important determinants of capital structure. This may answer the
question why debt nance has been a pervasive funding way before the corporate income
tax was introduced.5 Second, the wedge in equity nance caused by the dividend tax and
the otation cost of equity has ambiguous eects on leverage. They actually depend on
the rm's nancial position and protability. Rich and big rms decrease their leverage
5Frank and Goyal (2008) says in their conclusion section that \The U.S. corporate income tax did not
begin until 1909 when it was introduced at a 1% rate. The use of debt contracts by businesses has a much
longer history than does the corporate income tax. Thus, while taxes probably play an important role,
there must be more to it."
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while poor and small rms increase their leverage when the wedge in equity nance ex-
ists. Third, the default cost makes debt nance unattractive, but even if it is eliminated,
the rm would continue to use some equity nance. Fourth, the investment irreversibility
magnies the disadvantage of debt nance, but it would have no eect on leverage if the
wedge in equity nance did not exist. Fifth, corporate income tax cuts have large eects on
aggregate variables such as output and capital accumulation. Sixth, the elimination of the
default cost does not have signicant eects on the aggregate variables. This implies that
the eect of the default cost on aggregate variables may be overemphasized in previous
literature.
6
Chapter 2
Related Literature
In this chapter, I survey the literatures related to the main chapter of the Ph.D. thesis
(called \the current paper," hereafter). The objective of the current paper is to investi-
gate cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure using a heterogeneous rm
model with the trade o between tax benets and nancial distress costs, and to conduct
some policy experiments by the model. Roughly speaking, the current paper is related to
two dierent literatures: One is corporate capital structure in corporate nance theory and
the other is a macroeconomic model with rm heterogeneity. I review these two literatures
one by one.
2.1 Corporate Capital Structure
In this subsection, I review the papers about corporate capital structure choice. First, I
select a small number of key classic papers in corporate capital structure theory. Some of
them are not directly related to the current paper, but it is worthwhile to review them
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because they are starting points of the investigation in corporate capital structure. Second,
I review empirical papers about corporate capital structure. Since there are huge amount
of empirical papers in this eld, I choose the ones directly related to the current paper,
and summarize the stylized facts established by them. Finally, I review papers belonging
to the dynamic trade o literature. Since they are the most closely related works to the
current paper, I review each of them in detail.
2.1.1 Theories of Capital Structure
A starting point of the theoretical investigation in corporate capital structure is the irrel-
evance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1958). It argues that as long as rms maximize
just their value, the capital structure is irrelevant to their optimization problem. Because
this theorem assumes that there are no frictions such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency
costs, and asymmetric information, subsequent papers have tried to nd out which fric-
tions make corporate capital structure relevant to rms and investigate their implications.
Frank and Goyal (2008) is a survey paper reviewing those theoretical developments.
While many papers have been proposed, the trade o theory is one of the most ac-
cepted theories about corporate capital structure. It argues that rms choose their optimal
capital structure given the trade o between the advantage and disadvantage of debt. The
advantage of debt basically comes from taxes. Miller (1977) is a classic paper investigat-
ing the relationship between debt and taxes. He thinks of interest income taxation and
dividend taxation as well as corporate income taxation, and derives formula about how
tax benets change along with the tax rates. On the other hand, the disadvantage of
debt comes from nancial distress costs such as default costs and re sale costs. These
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costs discourage rms to use debt, because when rms are in nancial distress, they have
to bear those costs to pay back interest and/or principal of debt. In the trade o theory,
rms choose their capital structure under the advantage and disadvantage, and the current
paper basically adopts the trade o as one of determinants of corporate capital structure.
A testable implication of the trade o theory is that protable rms are more leveraged
because the tax benets are big and the expected nancial distress costs are low for prof-
itable rms, but it is against the empirical evidence. I will review the empirical facts in
the next subsection.
The pecking order theory proposed by Myers (1984) is another accepted theory re-
garding corporate capital structure. It argues that rms prefer the internal funding the
most, and when the internal funding is not enough to nance their investment, they issue
debt. Only if rms cannot issue debt anymore because of the default risk or other nancial
distress costs, they issue equity. This theory is called the pecking order theory because
of this strict hierarchy. He shows that this pecking order in capital structure choice is
justied by asymmetric information between rms and investors as long as debt nance is
less sensitive to information asymmetricity than equity nance.
Stiglitz (1973) is the rst paper investigating the eects of dividend taxation on corpo-
rate capital structure choice in a dynamic model. According to his model, with dividend
taxation, rms' nancing behavior would be like the pecking order theory. The logic is
simple. Firms prefer internal funding the most because using internal funding enables
them to reduce dividends and cut back dividend tax payments. Also, rms would prefer
debt to equity because issuing debt instead of equity means the prots will be distributed
to bond holders rather than equity holders in the future, and then rms will be able to
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cut back dividend tax payments. The current paper introduces the dividend taxation in
the same manner, and the mechanism proposed in his model plays a key role to induce the
pecking order behavior in the current paper too.
Besides those major theories, there are many other models to explain corporate capital
structure choice. Ross (1977) argues that the signalling eect of debt is a relevant deter-
minant of capital structure. Since issuing debt sends a signal to investors that they are
good rms, he argues that they choose their capital structure considering the signalling
eect. Stulz (1990) focuses on the trade o caused by the conict between equity-holders
and managers. He argues that issuing debt prevents managers from diverting money to
private benets, but, on the other hand, it causes underinvestment. Brander and Lewis
(1986) emphasize the interaction between corporate capital structure and production mar-
kets. They argue that in an imperfect competition environment, issuing debt works as a
commitment to produce their products and carry benets through the responses by other
rms. Corresponding chapters of Tirole (2006) review those models in more detail.
2.1.2 Empirical Facts about Capital Structure
Corporate capital structure is also one of central topics in empirical works. There are huge
amount of empirical papers in this eld, and so I choose and review the papers having
direct implications to the current paper in this section. Then I extract the stylized facts
established by them, and tell about the relations to the current paper.
I start with the stylized facts about the distribution of leverage in raw data, which is one
of main focus of the current paper. Frank and Goyal (2008) is a great survey summarizing
the basic facts of the dispersion, and so I pick some facts which are closely related to the
10
current paper from the survey. As for the cross sectional dispersion of leverage, they show
that many rms have very low leverage, say less than 10%. That is, many rms use no
debt nance at all. On the other hand, while the number of rms tends to decrease as
leverage increases, they also show that there exist rms taking more than 90% leverage.
As a result, the distribution of leverage is very widespread. In the current paper, it is
one of motivations whether the dispersion of leverage in the data can be replicated by an
economic model. As for the time series movement of leverage, Frank and Goyal (2008)
show that leverage in aggregate level is stationary over time, and remains around 30 %.
This fact encourages us to use stationary equilibrium approach when we analyze corporate
capital structure. Moreover, they compute the transition matrix of leverage and nd that
the time series movement of leverage in each rm level is also stable. That is, they show
that rms with high (low) leverage tend to have high (low) leverage in the next period too.
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) also shows that high (low) levered rms tend to be
high (low) levered for a long time. They use U.S. rm panel data in recent 40 years, and
nd that the autocorrelation process of corporate capital structure is very persistent over
time, and most part of corporate capital structure can be explained by a time invariant
xed eect of each rm. While those papers do not compare the process of leverage with
other processes, the autocorrelation of rm size measured by labor or asset is actually
more persistent than that of leverage. Therefore, it is natural to guess that the leverage
and rm size processes are governed by the same very persistent latent variable (i.e., rm's
productivity) rather than there exist adjustment costs for rebalancing corporate capital
structure.
As I explained in the previous section, a number of theories are proposed to account for
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the cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure. Among others, the current
paper is based on the trade o argument between tax benets and nancial distress costs,
and so an important strand of empirical works is the estimation of these two things: the tax
benets and the nancial distress costs. Graham (2000) is a seminal paper in the estimation
of tax benets. He estimates each rm's tax benet, which is basically generated by the
gap between tax rates on corporate income and personal interest income. He argues that
because the estimated tax benet is much bigger than conventional estimates of nancial
distress costs, it is dicult to justify corporate capital structure choices observed in data by
the trade o. He also nds that large and protable rms use debt conservatively, which
is against the implication of trade o theory. A number of papers, on the other hand,
estimate nancial distress costs including default costs and re sale costs. As for default
costs, the world bank measures them all over the world and publishes the result as a part of
\Doing Business" database. They basically accumulate fees for default procedures such as
attorney fees and court fees, and conclude that the default cost in the U.S. is about 7% of
the defaulted rm's estate. See Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) for how they
construct the database. As for re sale costs (i.e., the degree of investment irreversibility),
there are some empirical works, but the estimation results vary across them a little. The
lower bound is the estimate by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). They construct a structural
model and estimate the discount rate of asset sale by indirect inference using plant level
data in the U.S. The result is that rms discount the price of their assets like the machine
for production by about 20% when they sell them. The upper bound is the estimate by
Ramey and Shapiro (2001). They also estimate the discount rate of asset sale using aero
space industry data. According to their estimation, the cost varies among the types of
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assets, but it is around 60%. In the current paper, I use the default cost by the world
bank and the median value of re sale cost, say 40%. Finally, let me mention whether
those nancial distress costs are smaller than tax benets for most rms as is argued by
Graham (2000). In order to answer the question, it is important to estimate the marginal
increase of default probability with respect to leverage ratio because we need to use expected
nancial distress cost for the comparison. However, it is not straightforward to estimate it
because high leverage induces high default probability, but, at the same time, rms with
low default probability tend to have high leverage. Molina (2005) estimates the marginal
eect of leverage on the expected nancial distress costs using some instrument variables,
and shows that the marginal increases in expected nancial distress costs is big enough to
oset tax benets.
To investigate the cross sectional determinants of corporate capital structure, the most
straightforward way is to ask rms about their nancial strategy directly. Graham and
Harvey (2001) collects survey data from CFOs of U.S. rms and investigate which determi-
nants are relatively important for corporate capital structure choice. This survey contains
a lot of results, so I pick several results relevant to the current papers. First, they nd
that \nancial exibility" and \a good credit rating" are the top two determinants of debt
policy. They interpret \nancial exibility" as a precautionary motive related to future
interest payment obligation and \a good credit rating" as an indication of their concern
about nancial distress costs. They also nd that the \nancial exibility" is nothing
to do with asymmetric information. Second, they nd that rms do not care transac-
tion costs when they issue debt. They argues that it is against the hypothesis by Fischer,
Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). Third, they nd that the following determinants do not seem
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important: Conict between bond-holders and equity-holders, conict between managers
and equity-holders, productioin market, and a debt level of competitors. Fourth, only a
start-up rm considers equity as a cheap source of funds. All the results are just anecdotal
evidences, but it is worthwhile to check whether the results of the current model do not
contradict to those evidences.
Next, I talk about the empirical relationships between capital structure and other rms'
characteristics such as rm size and protability. These empirical relationships are just
relationships between endogenous variables and do not directly tell anything about the
cross sectional determinants, but they can be used in order to check the model validity
by seeing whether the model can account for those empirical relationships or not. To
investigate the empirical relationships, empirical researchers use rm level data in various
countries and periods. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) uses G7 countries' cross
sectional data, and Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) use the U.S. rm
panel data of COMPUSTAT. They put slightly dierent set of variables in the regressions,
but they regress the reduced form equation like the following one:
Book Leveragei = 0 + 1ROAi + 2 log(Employeei) + 3Market-to-Book Ratioi + i
ROA, the number of employees, and market-to-book ratio are used as proxies of prof-
itability, rm size, and growth expectation, respectively. The empirical papers share the
following estimation results:
1 < 0 and 2 > 0
That is, the coecient on the protability measured by ROA is negative and the coecient
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on the rm size measured by the number of employees (or asset size) is positive. The sign
of the coecient on the rms' growth expectation measured by market-to-book ratio, 3, is
controversial. For example, while Fama and French (2002) argues that it is positive, Rajan
and Zingales (1995) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) argues that it is negative.
Frank and Goyal (2009) shows the sign of the relationship varies over time and concludes
that the estimation result is not stable. Therefore, in the current paper, I just focus on
the relationships of leverage to protability and rm size, and use them as stylized facts
to be explained.1
The negative relationship between leverage and protability has particularly received
much attention from theoretical researchers because this negative relationship is puzzling
in the light of the trade o theory. This is because the tax benet is big and the prob-
ability of nancial distress is low for protable rms. Recently, introducing a dynamic
aspect enables the trade o theory to potentially account for the negativity. I will talk
about this \dynamic" trade o theory in the next section in detail. On the other hand,
the other relationship, the relationship between leverage and rm size, is hardly analyzed
by theoretical models, and, as a result, few models account for both relationships simulta-
neously. However, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) mentions, the magnitude of the negative
relationship between leverage and protability is much stronger for big rms than small
rms. In the current papers, I also investigate such size dependency of the relationship
between leverage and protability.
Finally, let me mention the empirical tests for the pecking order theory. The current
paper does not incorporate the original version of the pecking order theory, which is induced
1Tangibility of asset also has a clear positive relationship with leverage, but I do not mention tangibility
of asset in the current paper because it is dicult to incorporate the concept of tangibility into the model.
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by asymmetric information, but incorporate other mechanisms including dividend taxation
to induce the pecking order behavior. Therefore, it is worthwhile to review those empirical
papers about tests of the pecking order theory because they give some important and
testable stylized facts. There are two key notions in the empirical investigation of the
pecking order theory. The rst one is \nancial decit," which is dened as the investment
minus the internal funding.2 The pecking order theory argues that the nancing decit is
lled by debt rather than equity. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tests this argument by
the regressing the increase in debt on the nancing decit, and nds that the coecient
on the nancing decit is close to one, which is consistent with the pecking order theory.
However, Frank and Goyal (2003) extends the data to small rms and conducts the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers test. They nd that the pecking order theory ts well for large rms,
but poorly for small rms. That is, small rms use outside equity rather than debt to ll
the nancing decit. Lemmon and Zender (2009) focus on \debt capacity," which is the
second key notion in this literature. The debt capacity is dened as the maximum amount
of debt that the rm can borrow. Thus, when rms need to borrow more than the debt
capacity, rms would use outside equity. They assume that rms with debt ratings have
more debt capacity than rms with no debt ratings, because they are more accessible to
public debt markets. They nd that rms with no debt rating tend to issue outside equity
by violating the pecking order when their nancing decit is large. Because rms with no
debt ratings are usually small, rapid growth, young, and less protable rms, their result
is consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003). Leary and Roberts (2010) also get the same
results regarding the characteristics of rms which violate the pecking order theory. They
2Some people call it \naicial gap."
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also nd that the plain pecking order theory ts the data very poorly, but the t drastically
improves once controlling for other determinants proposed by the trade o theory. In sum,
these empirical papers testing the pecking order theory give the following testable stylized
facts: First, the nancing decit is basically lled by debt. Second, small, rapid growth,
young, and less protable rms tend to issue outside equity by violating the pecking order.
It is worthwhile to check whether the implications of the current model do not contradict
to these facts.
Lastly, let me mention the implication of the fact that the nancing decit is mainly
lled by debt. If this is the case, it would be dicult for the trade o model to account
for the negative relationship between leverage and protability. This is because protable
rms tend to invest more and expand their nancing decit, and then they have higher
leverage. It means that it is much more demanding to account for the negative rela-
tionship between leverage and protability under endogenous investment assumption than
exogenous one. As I will state in the next section, most dynamic trade o models with
adjustment costs of capital structure assume the exogenous corporate investment. Leary
and Roberts (2005) estimates a hazard function of capital structure change, and argues
that the costly rebalancing assumption can explain rms' dynamic rebalancing of capital
structure well after controlling for internal funding and investment expenditure. There-
fore, it is not obvious whether the results established by the dynamic trade o models with
exogenous investment are still valid under endogenous investment setting.
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2.1.3 Dynamic Trade O Theory
In this section, I review papers belonging to the dynamic trade o literature, which is
the most closely related literature to the current paper. Those papers have the following
features in common.
1. Firms endogenously choose their capital structure under the trade o between tax
benets and nancial distress costs,
2. Firms solve a dynamic optimization problem with uncertainty.
The second feature makes this literature dierent from the traditional static trade-o
models. As I explain below, introducing the dynamic aspect enables the trade o model to
replicate some cross sectional stylized facts, which are considered as puzzling in the light
of the traditional static trade o model. In particular, the negative relationship between
leverage and protability is considered as inconsistent with the trade o theory, but it is
not necessarily inconsistent in a dynamic setting. In the rest of this section, I review the
papers belonging to the dynamic trade o models one by one.
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) is a pioneering paper in this literature. They
assume that rms' value exogenously follows a stochastic path, and given the rm value,
rms choose their debt structure. Since they assume an adjustment cost for rebalancing
the capital structure, rms' capital structure does not respond until their leverage ratio
reaches the upper or lower thresholds for recapitalization (so called, (s, S) inventory control
problem). Thus, rms do not have a target value of leverage but have a target range of
leverage, and, as a result, their leverage ratios change infrequently and swing over time as
in data.
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Strebulaev (2007) uses a similar model setting to Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989)
and tries to replicate the negative relationship between leverage and protability. He
generates articial panel data by similar quantitative method to the current paper and tests
cross sectional implications including the relationship between leverage and protability.
A basic mechanism in his paper is that even though the rm's optimal leverage is positively
correlated with its protability, the actual leverage could be negatively correlated with its
protability because the leverage may deviate from its optimal level due to adjustment
costs for rebalancing the capital structure. Unlike the current paper, the model cannot
say anything about the relationship between rm sizes and leverage because corporate
investment is totally exogenous. As a result, his paper cannot consider any eects of
the nancing decit (gap between investment and internal fund) on leverage at all even
though it is said to be an important determinant of capital structure in empirical papers.
Therefore, it is not obvious whether the relationships replicated in his model are still valid
under endogenous corporate investment.
While most dynamic trade o models assume only a persistent stochastic shock to rms'
cash ow or value, Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010) assumes a temporary shock in addition
to a persistent shock as the current paper does. They focus on the fact that the volatility
of asset value is much lower than that of cash ow, and shows that the temporary shock
can induce the dierence between these volatilities. The main contribution of their paper
is that such volatile corporate earnings make debt riskier and less attractive than assumed
in a standard dynamic trade o model, and resolve the low leveraged puzzle proposed by
Graham (2000). The same eect is crucial to replicate low leverage in the current paper
too, but, in addition to this eect, the temporary shock also plays a key role to replicate
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the negative relationship between leverage and protability in the current paper.
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006) focuses on the relationship between leverage and rm
size as the current paper. They still assume exogenous investment and payout policy, but
incorporate a xed cost to adjust capital structure in addition to a proportional cost. As
a result of the xed cost, very small rms do not use debt at all in their model because
the xed cost to lever up is too expensive, and then those unleveraged small rms induce
the positive relationship between leverage and rm size. On the other hand, the logic of
the current paper to account for the positive relationship between leverage and rm size
is much simpler: Productive rms optimally invest more and expand their size. At the
same time, because those productive rms tend to have large nancing decit and are more
accessible to debt markets, their leverage tend to be higher.
All papers up to this point assume that corporate earnings, investment, and payout
are totally exogenous. As I stated above, it is doubtful whether the results replicated by
the models with the exogenous investment assumption are valid without the assumption
because they do not consider the eect of nancing decit, which is said to be an important
determinant of corporate capital structure. Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007) are break-
through papers in this literature because they assume endogenous investment and payout
policy as well as endogenous capital structure choice. They assume a realistic tax system
and nancial distress costs, and account for the negative relationship between leverage and
protability under the trade o. The most important dierence between their paper and
the current paper is that their model is a partial equilibrium model focusing on a certain
rm's optimal capital structure choice while the current paper is a general equilibrium
model with entry/exit. Therefore, their model cannot consider the eect of rm evolution
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on leverage, and it induces a signicant dierence in the results of counterfactual analysis.
Also, since they do not consider the decomposition of productivity and economies of scale,
it is likely that their model cannot replicate the relationship of leverage to protability and
rm size, simultaneously.
Tserlukevich (2008) also replicates the negative relationship between leverage and prof-
itability by the model with endogenous investment. In his model, rms' investment re-
sponds to protability shocks less frequently due to investment irreversibility, and so the
positive protability shocks just increase the equity value and decrease their leverage in
many cases. Therefore, their leverage negatively correlated with their protability even
though rms lever up when they invest. His argument is theoretically clear, but obviously
needs very severe investment irreversibility. The degree of investment irreversibility is 60%
at most in empirical papers as I stated, but he assumes 100% investment irreversibility in
the quantitative part of his paper. Thus, it seems dicult to quantitatively explain the
negative relationship between leverage and protability only by this mechanism.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) incorporates an exogenous debt capacity into
a dynamic trade o model with endogenous investment and payout, and account for very
conservative leverage behavior, which is consistent with Graham (2000). In their model,
rms tend to keep their debt capacity for future funding needs because outside equity is
more costly than debt. Thus rms do not completely ll their nancing decit by debt
as in data. The current paper has the same mechanism, but the rm's debt capacity
is endogenously determined in the current paper. That is, in the current paper, rms
take a conservative leverage behavior because debt becomes more costly than internal and
external equity funding as they lever up.
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Finally, let me mention a criticism to the dynamic trade o models. Welch (2010) argues
that dynamic trade o models should be tested by out-of-samples or quasi-experiments to
validate their quantitative results in addition to in-sample moments. Moreover, he argues
that it seems impossible for quantitative structural models like dynamic trade o models
to specify all of the key determinants of corporate capital structure because there are so
many determinants. He concludes that a simple reduced form model is more suitable for
corporate nance than a complicated structural quantitative model.
2.2 Macroeconomic Model with Firm Heterogeneity
Next I move on to the other literature related to the current paper: heterogeneous rm
model. In the current paper, I adopt a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
rms as a baseline model, and then introduce a number of frictions including investment
irreversibility, nancial contract with costly defaults, and taxes. These frictions correspond
to the ones assumed in a dynamic trade o theory, and make the capital structure relevant
to rms' optimization.
There are two seminal classic papers in this literature. The rst one is Hopenhayn
(1992). He constructs a partial equilibrium model where each rm faces persistent id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks and chooses to stay or exit in every period. He proposes a
concept of \stationary equilibrium as an equilibrium concept of the economy. In the station-
ary equilibrium, each rm actively entries/exits and evolves in response to the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, but the whole economy is stationary over time and characterized by
a time invariant distribution of rms (so called, a stationary distribution) because rms'
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entry/exit and expansion/shrink are oset each other. He shows that the stationary equi-
librium with positive mass of rms' entry/exist exists under some weak conditions. The
other seminal paper in this literature is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). They introduce
a household sector into the Hopenhayn-model and extend the model to a dynamic general
equilibrium model.
A key assumption to characterize the stationary equilibrium in heterogeneous rm
models is a decreasing return to scale of the production function. If the production function
is constant return to scale as a standard neoclassical growth model, the most productive
rm would keep all resources and any rm heterogeneity would not exit. In the current
paper, I assume that the production function is decreasing return to scale according to this
conventional wisdom.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, I review the papers that account
for some basic rms' characteristics including their entry/exit, life-cycle, and size distri-
bution by a heterogeneous rm model. Second, I focus on some papers that account for
rms' behavior towards corporate investment and capital structure like the current paper.
Since they are very closely related to the current papers, I review each paper one by one in
detail. Third, I review the papers about resource misallocation. The current paper is not
directly related to the resource misallocation between rms, but I pick some seminal papers
and review their motivation and contributions because it is the most growing literature for
a heterogeneous rm model. Finally, I briey review some other elds of study where a
heterogeneous rm model is applied.
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2.2.1 Firm's Life-Cycle, Entry/Exit, and Size Distribution
Some stylized facts about rm heterogeneity in terms of the life cycle, entry/exit and
size distribution have been established by micro data of rms. For example, Business
Dynamics Statistics at the U.S. Census Bureau shows, for example, that the exit rates are
higher for small and young rms than large and old ones, the rm size distribution is stable
over time, young rms' size distribution is more skewed rightward than that of old rms,
and so on. Some empirical papers use other countries' micro data of rms (e.g., Cabral
and Mata (2003) for Portuguese data, Angelini and Generale (2008) for Italian data, and
Mukoyama (2009) for Japanese data) to establish the stylized facts in those countries.
Since Hopenhayn (1992) provides a great vehicle to think of rm heterogeneity, one of
natural questions using his model is whether a heterogeneous rm model can account for
those stylized facts. Some classic papers including Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) obtain
results which are roughly consistent with those stylized facts, but some recent papers
construct more sophisticated models and try to account for rms' behavior more precisely.
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) investigates a rm's life cycle (that is, rms are born as small
ones, grow as time goes on, and eventually exit from the economy) by an overlapping
generation model with heterogeneous rms. In particular, they focus on the process of
organization capital : the accumulated rm-specic knowledge. They show that their model
can account for the age dependency of employment, job creation, and job destruction in
the U.S. rms fairly well, and argue that the payment to the organization capital accounts
for about 40% of payment to intangible assets.
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Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) investigates size dependency of rm's behavior
by incorporating industry-specic human capital accumulation into a heterogeneous rm
model. By doing so, the rm's technololy becomes decreasing return to scale with respect
to capital, and, as a result, their model exhibits a \mean reversion" of rm's characteris-
tics. Since this \mean reversion" induces the negative correlation between rm size and
growth rate, their model obtains the result that the size distribution has thinner tails than
Preto distribution particularly in capital intensive sectors as is observed in data.3
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) investigates the size (age) dependency of rm's behavior
among rms with the same age (size). First, they show that without any nancial frictions
or persistency of productivity shocks, rm's behavior would be independent of its age after
controlling for its size. Next, they explicitly incorporate a debt contract with endogenous
defaults between the nancial intermediaries and rms. By doing so, rm's equity be-
comes a state variable in addition to its productivity because it has an eect on its credit
availability. Then, as the rm age is correlated with the level of equity, the simultaneous
dependencies emerge.4 Methodologically, this is the rst paper which incorporates nancial
intermediaries and one-period debt contract with endogenous defaults into a heterogeneous
rm model.5 Subsequent papers including Hennessy and Whited (2007), Gilchrist, Sim,
3Even though the rm size distribution has thinner tails than Pareto distribution in data, there are a
number of papers arguing that the rm size distribution theoretically has to follow Pareto distribution (so
called, Zipf's law). See Luttmer (2010) for a survey of this literature.
4There are some empirical papers about the relationship between rm size distribution and nancial
constraints. Cabral and Mata (2003) shows that the rightward skewness can be explained by nancial
frictions rather than a selection mechanism. Angelini and Generale (2008) show that nancial frictions are
signicant determinants to account for the rm size distribution, particularly for small and young rms,
but they also show that nancial frictions have a limited explanatory power to a rm size distribution in
nancially developed countries like OECD countries.
5It is common in business cycle literature to incorporate the same type of one-period debt contract
into a dynamic general equilibrium model (e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999)). Gale and Hellwig (1985) shows that the one-period debt contract would be optimal
among general one-period contracts in a static model if there exists a monitoring cost (or a default cost),
but, unfortunately, in a dynamic model with persistent shocks such as Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and
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and Zakrajsek (2010) and the current paper utilize the contractual environment of a risky
debt proposed by this model.
Firm's entry and exit has been analyzed in a stationary setting, but its behavior over
the business cycle attracts more attentions recently. Campbell (1998) is a classic paper
about this topic. He describes that both entry and exit rates are positively correlated with
business cycles, and, in particular, exit rates lead the productivity growth. He constructs
a structural model and solves it by a linear-quadratic approximation, and then accounts
for those pro-cyclicality.
Samaniego (2008) constructs a similar heterogeneous rm model and solves it by non-
linear method. He considers a deviation from the stationary equilibrium as an aggregate
productivity shock, and computes a deterministic transition path in which the economy
returns to the stationary equilibrium. He documents that while entry and exit rates are
pro-cyclical, the magnitude of their eects on aggregate variables including output and
employment is negligible.
It is very hard to incorporate an aggregate productivity shock into heterogeneous rm
models with entry and exit because of the \curse of dimensionality" problem in general, but
recently Clementi and Palazzo (2010) uses an approximation method proposed by Krussel
and Smith (1998) to investigate the role of entry and exit over the business cycle, and nds
out that rm's entry and exit amplies the uctuations in aggregate variables. While I
assume that there is no aggregate shock in the current paper, it is a promising extension
to incorporate the aggregate shock by using the method in their paper.
the current paper, their result cannot be directly applied. Thus, as long as I know, it is an open question
whether a debt contract is optimal in those models.
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2.2.2 Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
The most closely related application eld of heterogeneous rm models to the current paper
is the literature of corporate investment and capital structure. Gomes (2001) investigates
whether nancial constraints induce the cash ow eect in corporate investment. He con-
structs a heterogeneous rm model with entry and exit and incorporates a otation cost of
equity as a nancial constraint. He derives a stationary distribution in the equilibrium, and
then randomly generates articial cross sectional data from the distribution for comparison
with the empirical results. He concludes that the cash ow eect on investment is nothing
to do with nancial constraints, but caused just by measurement errors. The current paper
actually uses the same quantitative methodology to test cross sectional implications.
Khan and Thomas (2008) investigates why the aggregate investment over business cy-
cles is relatively smooth while the investment of individual rm is \lumpy." They show
that the aggregate investment is as lumpy as the investment of individual rms in a par-
tial equilibrium model, but this lumpiness in the aggregate investment disappears when
the model is extended to a general equilibrium model because general equilibrium eects
dampen the response of investment. Methodologically, this is the rst paper which incor-
porates an aggregate productivity shock into heterogeneous rm models. They basically
apply the method proposed by Krussel and Smith (1998). The method used in their pa-
per to approximate the aggregate state is adopted in subsequent papers including Bloom,
Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010) and Gomes and Schmid (2010).
Miao (2005) investigates corporate capital structure and entry/exit behavior by the
stationary equilibrium approach as the current paper. He constructs a general equilibrium
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model with endogenous corporate capital structure choice and default, and accounts for
some stylized facts and conducts counterfactual experiments. This paper is the most closely
related to the current paper in the sense of motivation, but, unlike the current paper, he
makes several drastic simplications to obtain closed form solutions. For example, he
assumes a perpetual bond which pays a xed amount of coupon, and the amount of the
bond is xed after they enter the economy. Moreover, he considers only a corporate income
tax as a relevant tax for rms, and assumes that rms never choose to pay dividends. The
current paper, on the other hand, focuses on quantitative solutions under more realistic
circumstance while it does not give closed form solutions.6
Gomes and Schmid (2010) investigate credit spreads, equity premium, and capital struc-
ture simultaneously by a heterogeneous rm model with aggregate productivity shocks.
They extend a standard heterogeneous rm model with entry and exit so that rms en-
dogenously choose their capital structure. At the same time, however, they abstract from
many aspects for simplicity. For example, they assume that the size and structure of rms'
balance sheet is xed once it is decided when rms enter the economy. They show that the
model accounts for the level of credit spread as well as corporate leverage, equity premium,
and business cycle statistics. Their result implies that aggregate productivity shocks play
an important role to explain those things simultaneously. The current paper can dene
credit spreads inside the model too, but since the current paper does not incorporate an
aggregate shock, it is not surprising that it cannot account for the level of credit spread.
6In the conclusion part of his paper, he said that introducing a dynamic capital structure choice as the
current paper does is one of promising future extensions of his paper.
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2.2.3 Resource Misallocation and Macroeconomy
As some empirical papers show, resource allocation is an important aspect to account
for the measured TFP in a whole economy. In response to the accumulation of such
empirical evidences, resource (mis)allocation is now becoming one of the most growing
literatures for heterogeneous rm models. I discuss the literature in two parts below:
resource misallocation by nancial allocation and that by other reasons.
As for the resource misallocation due to nancial frictions, Buera and Shin (2010)
explores how nancial frictions aect the convergence to the steady state economy. They
construct a heterogeneous agent model with an occupational choice: people can either
produce by their own technology or work as a labor force. They consider the case that
the resource is misallocated by some distortions such as taxes or other government policies
in the initial state. They show that the economy would converge to a new steady state
when the distortions are eliminated, but nancial frictions slow down the speed of the
convergence. This is because, with nancial frictions, people need to accumulate the assets
for collateral use in order to fund for production.
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) investigates the dierence in TFP between developed
and developing countries. In particular, they focus on the fact that the dierence in TFP
is bigger in the sector where the economy of scale is large. They use an occupational
choice model similar to Buera and Shin (2010), and extend it to two-sector model, where
these sectors are dierent in terms of the degree of scale economy. Their main argument
is that nancial frictions are more relevant in the sector with large scale economy like the
manufacturing sector because people need to use more capital for producing their products
29
eciently. Therefore, since people with high ability cannot operate due to the nancial
friction, TFP would be depressed through talent misallocation.
Moll (2010) constructs a heterogeneous agent model with collateral constraint and
accounts for the output dierence between countries with dierent degree of nancial
frictions. In particular, in his model, the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
plays a key role to determine the eect of nancial frictions. If it's not persistent, nancial
frictions do not have any eects on capital allocation and aggregate output because people
can nance their investment by their own savings eventually.
Midrigan and Xu (2010) also investigates the relationship between aggregate TFP
and resource misallocation. In particular, they focus on how much the misallocation is
quantitatively explained by nancial frictions. They construct a heterogeneous agent model
where people are forced to fund their operational costs in advance, and incorporate nancial
frictions as a collateral constraint. They show that the nancial friction could generate the
big dierence in TFP, but under plausible calibration values, the TFP dierence through
the misallocation caused by the nancial friction in their model is too small to account for
the TFP dierence in data.7
As for the resource misallocation due to other reasons, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
investigates how the introduction of a ring tax aects the aggregate variables such as
output and labor productivity. They calibrate the model without the ring tax by U.S.
micro data, and then introduce the ring tax and compare the stationary equilibriums
before and after the introduction of the tax. They show that the ring tax decreases
output through decrease in employment because the ring tax increases the labor cost.
7This result is consistent with Buera and Shin (2010), which argues that it is impossible to generate the
dierence in TFP between developed and developing countries only by nancial frictions.
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Also, and more importantly, the ring tax decreases output through decline in productivity
too because the ring tax disrupts smooth reallocation of labor force between rms. As
a whole, while introduction of the ring tax reduces the uctuation of employment, it
induces a substantial decrease in output.
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) investigates how resource distortions induce decline in
measured TFP by a very standard heterogeneous rm model with capital and labor. They
introduce output taxation as a source of distortion and see its eect on TFP and output.
First, they show that if the tax rate is uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity, the
distortion is not that big, but if it is positively correlated (i.e., productive rms are taxed
more), the distortion is pretty big. For example, when the tax rate is equal to 40%,
the uncorrelated distortion induces just 8% decline in TFP, but the correlated distortion
induces 31% decline in TFP.
Gourio (2008) investigates the eect of reallocation induced by removal of a capital
adjustment cost. In particular, he emphasizes how much the eect changes if rm's pro-
ductivity process is incorrectly specied. He constructs a heterogeneous rm model with
permanent, persistent and transitory idiosyncratic productivity shocks. He utilizes the
fact that corporate investment responds to the persistent shocks rather than the transi-
tory shocks to identify those productivity shocks by micro data, and estimates the model
parameters by the simulated method of moment. He puts those estimated parameters
into a general equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity, and show that the dierence in
specication of the productivity process signicantly aects the eect of the removal of a
capital adjustment cost.
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2.2.4 Other Applicatioins
There are some other elds of study where heterogeneous rm models are used. The
rst eld is rm's pricing behavior. Golosov and Lucas (2007) investigates the \price
stickiness" observed in data by incorporating an adjustment cost for changing prices (i.e.,
a menu cost). They argue that their model is more natural than Calvo-type model because,
in their model, rms with prices far from the optimal level tend to change the prices while,
in Calvo-type model, rms change the prices regardless of their current prices. They show
that the eect of monetary policy on output in their model is much smaller than that
in the model with Calvo-type price setting (e.g., New Keynesian model) because of this
selection mechanism.
Midrigan (2010) also measures the eect of monetary policy by a heterogeneous rm
model with a menu cost. He shows that Golosov and Lucas (2007) cannot account for
heterogeneity in the size of price changes and temporary price changes. In order to replicate
those features, rst, he assumes two types of prices: regular prices and posted prices.
Then he also assumes a scale economy only for the regular price change and a fat-tail
distribution for idiosyncratic cost shocks. These assumptions not only enable the model
account for those features, but also induce a much bigger eect of monetary policy than
that in a standard menu cost model. This is because, rst, there are fewer rms around the
threshold when the distribution of cost shocks has a fat-tail, and second, a scale economy
makes the size of most price changes smaller.
The second eld is about the uncertainty shock. Bloom (2009) denes the uncertainty
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shock as changes in volatility of idiosyncratic productivity shocks of each rm, and in-
vestigates their eect on aggregate labor and output. First, he shows by VAR that the
uncertainty shock induces a sharp decline in a short term and an overshoot in a medium
term in output and aggregate employment. Then he constructs a heterogeneous rm model
with investment and labor irreversibility, and shows that the model accounts for the re-
sponse to the uncertainty shock. The intuition of the sharp decline is that increases in
volatility expand the inaction area caused by the irreversibility, and, as a result, decrease
Solow residual due to misallocation between plants. On the other hand, because increases
in volatility enhance the fraction of rms outside the inaction region, they increase medium-
term employment and generate output overshoot.
The third eld of application is a trade theory. Melitz (2003) investigates the eect of
trade on the welfare and aggregate productivity. He extends a heterogeneous rm model
with rm's entry/exit to a trade model with monopolistic competition, and compares the
economies with and without a trade opportunity. The main result is that the aggregate
productivity and welfare would improve through reallocation between rms when the trade
is available for rms. The intuition is as follows: When the trade becomes available,
only productive rms expand their share by exporting their products because exporting
products is assumed to be costly. On the other hand, less productive rms produce just for
the domestic market and shrink their share, or they exit if their expected prot is negative.
As a result, with the trade opportunity, more productive rms produce more, and then
the aggregate productivity and welfare would improve through the reallocation.
The fourth, and last, eld of application is public nance. Gourio and Miao (2010a,b)
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simultaneously incorporate corporate income tax, capital gain tax, dividend tax, and in-
come tax into a heterogeneous rm model, and quantify the eect of dividend tax reform
introduced in the U.S. in 2003. Gourio and Miao (2010a) investigates the eect of the
permanent change in the dividend and capital gain tax, and argues that the U.S. tax re-
form increased a long-run capital stock by about 4%. They show that rm heterogeneity
is important for precisely measuring the eects of tax reforms because the dividend tax
aects long-run capital accumulation through changes in capital allocation between rms.
They also show that if they ignore the general eect, the eect on capital accumulation
would become about six-times larger. Gourio and Miao (2010b) extends Gourio and Miao
(2010a) by incorporating a risky debt in addition to equity and model the endogenous
choice of corporate capital structure.8 Then they investigate the eect of the temporary
tax cut and its transitional dynamics.
8While they assume tax deductibility of interest payments, they do not incorporate any nancial distress
costs into the model but just assume the collateral constraint. Therefore, unlike the current paper, there
is not the trade-o between tax benets and nancial distress cost associated with the debt nancing in
their model.
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Chapter 3
Model
The model is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms
and their endogenous entry/exit like Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Gomes (2001).
In the model, each rm is hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, but not aggregate
productivity shocks. By this assumption, the model has a competitive equilibrium with a
stationary distribution regarding rm's characteristics. In a quantitative part, I consider
this stationary distribution as a counterpart of cross sectional data in the real economy,
and explore the logic behind the stylized facts using articial data generated from the
stationary distribution.1
The economy consists of three types of agents: rms, households and nancial inter-
mediaries (FI). The rm produces consumption goods by asset and labor in every period.
It nances the asset by three nancing sources. The rst one is an internal funding gen-
erated by the accumulation of their prot. The second one is outside equity coming from
1As Frank and Goyal (2008) states, the aggregate leverage ratios is very stable over time. This fact
justies the assumption that there is no aggregate shock.
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the household through an equity market. The third one is a business loan from the FI.
Note that the rst two sources are listed as \equity" and the third one is listed as \debt"
in a liability side of its balance sheet. As a result of its optimal choices between the three
nancing sources, the capital structure is determined endogenously in the model.
The household is homogeneous and innitely lived, and maximizes the lifetime utility
by consumption and labor supply. The household's nancial asset consists of the share of
the rm and the risk-free deposit at the FI. The income consists of wages, dividends on the
share and interests on the deposit. The household uses the income to buy consumption
goods and new shares, and the rest is deposited at the FI at the risk-free rate.
The last agent in the model is the FI. It collects deposit from the household at risk-free
rate and lend it to the rm as a business loan. Since I assume a competitive FI market,
the FI's expected prot is zero.2 As to the nancial contract between the FI and the rm,
I limit the contract space to a standard one-period debt contract with default costs as in
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007). I do not show that a simple
one-period debt contract is an optimal contract in this model setting, but the fact that it is
one of the most common nancial contracts in the real economy justies the assumption.3
2Actually, since I focus just on a stationary economy, the ex-post FI's prot is also always equal to zero
due to a law of large number.
3Limiting the contract space to a one-period debt contract signicantly simplies the model, but ex-
cludes the following more general contract schemes from the contract space in the rst place. First, I
exclude a dynamic lending contract under asymmetric information as in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)
and Quadrini (2004). Second, I exclude one-period nancial contracts outside a debt-contract. Gale and
Hellwig (1985) shows that a debt contract would be optimal among general one-period contracts if in-
formation frictions between lenders and borrowers and a monitoring cost (or a default cost) exist, but,
unfortunately, I cannot directly utilize their result because the current model is a dynamic model with
persistent idiosyncratic shocks while their model is a static model.
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3.1 Firms
There is a continuum of rms producing nal goods by asset and labor. In every period,
after the rm produces nal goods, it has the following three choices: continue the business,
exit from the economy or default on its loan. There is also a continuum of new entrants.
When they enter the economy, their initial productivity is drawn from some distribution.
Given the initial productivity, the new entrants decide whether they stay or immediately
exit from the economy without producing anything. In a stationary equilibrium, the dis-
tribution of rm's characteristics is \stationary" in the sense that it does not change before
and after the rm's entry/exit because their entry/exit is oset each other.
3.1.1 Technology
The rm uses two inputs, asset, k, and labor, l, to produce consumption goods. As to its
technology, I assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
y = zkk ll :
I assume diminishing return to scale, k + l < 1.
4 z is an idiosyncratic productivity to
each rm. This idiosyncratic productivity consists of two parts: persistent component, zp,
and transitory component, .
z  zp  
4This assumption makes a rm size matter. If the technology is constant return to scale and there is
heterogeneity in rm's productivity, it would be ecient that the rm with the highest productivity uses
all asset and labor, and the rm's distribution would be degenerate.
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The persistent part follows the AR(1) process after log-transformation,
log(zp;t) =  log(zp;t 1) + t where t  N(; ) (3.1)
and produces the heterogeneity in characteristics of rms such as size and capital structures.
The transitory component, on the other hand, follows a Normal distribution after log-
transformation.
log(t)  N(0; )
3.1.2 Prot
A competitive consumption goods market is assume. As a result, the price level of the
consumption goods is the same for all rms, and it is normalized to one. Then the revenue
(i.e., the price times the amount of sale) is equal to the amount of sale, zkk ll .
In order to make it easy to dene the rm's dynamic optimization problem, I dene the
optimal labor choice as a static problem rst. I assume that the rm chooses the number
of employees for the current period after the realization of the persistent component of its
productivity, zp;t, but before the realization of the transitory component of its productivity,
t.
5 Let l be the optimal level of labor input,
l(k; zp; w) = argmaxl
n
zpk
k ll   wl|{z}
labor cost
o
(3.2)
where w is a wage rate. Note that zpk
k ll is an expected revenue of the rm at the
5I need this assumption to account for a very persistent autocorrelation process of labor in data. If
the rm can change the number of employees after it knows the transitory component of its productivity,
then the autocorrelation of labor process would be very volatile because it reects the uctuation of the
transitory component in every period.
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moment they choose the level of labor input because E[] = 1 and Cov(zp; ) = 0.
Given the optimal choice of labor, l(k; zp; w), I dene the rm's prot before an interest
payment, a tax payment and depreciation (so called, EBITDA) as follows:
(k; z; w) = zkk ll   wl   cf|{z}
fixed cost
The rm must pay a xed cost, cf , in every period when it continues its operation. The
xed cost gives unproductive rms an incentive to shut down their business and exit from
the economy. Without the xed cost, the lower bound of the rm's prot would be zero
and no rms would have incentive to exit from the economy. Moreover, the xed cost
induces an economy of scale, which is an important mechanism in the model. Actually,
without the xed cost, rm's protability measured by ROA is almost independent of rm
size and productivity, zp, because productive rms get large and protable.
3.1.3 Evolution of the Firm's Balance Sheet
Figure 3.1 represents a typical rm's balance sheet at the beginning of period. k is a
physical asset and n is the amount of equity at the beginning of period. When the amount
of asset is more than that of equity, i.e., k n > 0, then k n is the amount of debt. When
k  n > 0, the rm uses two dierent nancing sources, equity and debt nance. The rm
pays interests to the FI and dividends to the household. A debt contract between the rm
and the FI is dened as a combination of the amount of debt and the interest rate assigned
on the debt (k   n; r). On the other hand, when the amount of asset is less than that of
equity, i.e., k n < 0, then k n is the rm's deposit at the FI. In this case, I assume that
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Figure 3.1: Balance Sheet at the Beginning of Period
the return of the rm's deposit is equal to the risk-free rate, rf .
6
Let the rm's equity at the end of the period be e. Given the amount of asset, k,
the amount of equity at the beginning of the period, n, a debt contract, (k   n; r), the
productivity, z, and wage, w, its EBITDA, which is denoted by (k; z; w), is determined.
Given the rm's EBITDA, the rm's equity at the end of the period, e(k; n; z; r; w), is
determined as follows:
e(k; n; z; r; w) = (1  c)
h
(k; z; w)  k   r(k   n)
i
+ n
where  is a depreciation rate of the physical asset and c is the tax rate of corporate
income tax. The inside of the bracket is a taxable income, which is EBITDA minus the
depreciation of asset and an interest payment. This denition of the taxable income is
6Under this setting, the rm cannot have both debt and deposit simultaneously. Since a number of rms
have both of them in the real economy, it is an interesting extension to allow it.
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consistent with the tax system in many countries including the U.S. After paying the
corporate income tax, its current prot, (1  c)
h
(k; z; w)  k  r(k n)
i
, is determined.
Thus the law of motion of the rm's equity basically says that the equity at the end of
the period is the sum of its equity at the beginning of the period, n, plus its current prot.
An important point here is that this tax system gives the rm a huge incentive to use
debt nance instead of equity nance or internal funding due to the tax deductibility of
interest payments. That is, the rm can decrease the amount of the corporate income tax
by increasing the amount of debt, (k   n), because the corporate income tax is levied on
the rm's income after interest payments.
3.1.4 Dynamic Optimization
Figure 3.2 summarizes the timing of the rm's decision. Given the amount of equity at
the end of period, e(k; n; z; r; w), the rm solves two dynamic optimization problems. The
rst one is continue/exit/default decision and the second one is an investment decision.
In the rest of this subsection, I explain those two dynamic optimization problems step by
step.
First of all, let me dene the rm's dividend, d(k0; n0; e; k), as follows:
d(k0; n0; e; k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  d)[e(k; n; z; r)  (1  c)g(k0; k)  n0]; d  0
(1 + )[e(k; n; z; r)  (1  c)g(k0; k)  n0]; d < 0
where k0 and n0 are the asset and equity in the next period, respectively. g(k0; k) is a
downward adjustment cost, which the rm has to pay when it decreases the amount of
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Figure 3.2: Timing of Firm's Decision
asset from k to k0. That is, it is dened as
g(k0; k) = maxf((1  )k   k0); 0g where 0   < 1
This type of adjustment cost is often called a partial investment irreversibility and used
in many corporate nance and macroeconomics papers including Abel and Eberly (1994)
and Veracierto (2002).7 The above denition of the rm's dividend basically says that
the dividend, d, is dened as what the rm owns at the end of the period, e(k; n; z; r),
minus what the rm keeps for the next period as its equity, n0, and the adjustment cost,
(1   c)g(k0; k). That is, the dividend is determined as a residual when the rm makes
its investment and nancing decision, i.e., it chooses k0 and n0. A little bit complicated
point here is that the rm faces dierent frictions depending on whether the amount of its
7Note that the adjustment cost is parallel to the ring tax assumed in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
While rms need to pay a linear adjustment cost when they decrease the amount of labor in their model,
rms have to pay the same type of cost when they decrease assets in my model. Thus I expect similar
eects in both models.
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dividend is positive or negative. When it is positive, the rm has to pay the dividend tax.
Its tax rate is denoted by d. On the other hand, when the dividend is negative, it means
that the amount of equity nance is positive, and, in this case, it has to pay a proportional
otation cost for equity nancing, . The otation cost is introduced to capture the costs
such as fees paid to securities companies.8
Exit Decision
The rst dynamic optimization problem for the rm is a discrete choice about whether the
rm continues its business. As Figure 3.2 describes, after its prot is determined, the rm
has three choices: continue, exit, or default. The discrete choice problem is formulated as
follows:
v^(e; k; zp) = max
n
v(e; k; zp)| {z }
continue
; d(0; 0; e; k)| {z }
exit
; 0|{z}
default
o
The rst term in the brace is the option to continue the business. v(e; k; zp) is the rm's
value when it decides to continue the business given the rm's equity, e, asset, k, and
productivity, zp. I will dene v(e; k; z; r; w) later. The second choice is to quit the business
and exit from the economy. In this case, the rm would sell all of its assets and payout
d(0; 0; e; k), the dividend when k0 = n0 = 0. Note that the rm distributes the rest of
money to households after it pays back all of its debt to the FI when the rm exits form
the economy. The third and last choice is to default on its loan. In this case, the rm
8Gomes (2001) estimates the otation cost and argues that there is a xed otation cost as well as a
variable cost. Hennessy and Whited (2007), on the other hand, argues that a marginal otation cost is not
constant, but increasing. Despite these estimations, I use a linear otation cost for simplicity.
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gets nothing, but does not have to pay anything due to the limited liability assumption.
Thus a dierence between \exit" and \default" in the model is that when it chooses to
exit, it has to pay back all of its debt to the FI, but when it chooses to default, it does
not have to pay it back. Therefore, if the rm expects that some money will be left even
after paying back all debt, the rm would choose to exit rather than default. The other
dierence between exit and default is that when the rm declares default, it may continue
its business by getting minimum nancial support from the FI. I will explain more about
the response of the FI to defaulting rms when I describe the FI's behavior in the next
section.
Let h(e; k; zp) be the policy function of the discrete decision problem. First, h(e; k; zp) =
1 if the rm continues its business. Second, h(e; k; zp) = 2 if the rm exits from the
economy. Finally, h(e; k; zp) = 3 if the rm defaults on its loan.
Even when the rm chooses to continue its business in the above endogenous exit
decision, I assume that the rm is hit by an exogenous exit shock with probability .
When the rm is hit by the exogenous exit shock, it must exit from the economy.9 Given
the exogenous exit shock, the value function v(e; k; zp) is dened as follows:
v(e; k; zp) = (1  )  ~v(e; k; zp) +   d(0; 0; e; k)
where ~v(e; k; zp) is the value of the rm given that it continues the business. This value is
9This shock is introduced in order to capture the fact that big rms also exit from the economy as well
as small rms in data. Without the exogenous exit shock, only small rms would exit from the economy
in the model, because rm size and protability are strongly correlated and protability is the only reason
to exit from the economy in the model. The exogenous exit is a little ad-hoc assumption, but it is justied
by the fact that rms are sometimes hit by some exogenous shocks (scandals, disasters, no successors and
so on) in the real economy.
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dened in the rm's maximization problem about investment and nancing below.
Investment and Financing Decision
The second maximization problem for the rm is investment and nancing decision. The
rm faces the second problem only when the rm chooses to continue its business (i.e., it
chooses the rst option in the rst maximization problem above) and it is not hit by the
exogenous exit shock. In this problem, the rm simultaneously chooses the size of balance
sheet (i.e., the amount of asset, k0) and its capital structure (i.e., the amount of equity n0)
for the next period. I assume that the rm signs a one-period debt contract (k0   n0; r0)
with the FI to use debt nancing. The value function, ~v(e; k; zp), is dened as follows:
~v(e; k; zp) = max
n0;k0;r0
n
d(k0; n0; e; k) + Ez0pjzp;

v^(e(k0; n0; z0; r0); k0; z0)
o
(3.3)
s.t. FI's zero prot condition (3.4)
where d is the amount of dividends and  is a discount factor. Note that I formulate the
contractual problem as if the rm chooses the lending rate in a debt contract, r0, subject
to the FI's zero prot condition (i.e., an individual rationality condition for the FI), which
will be dened in the next section. The interest rate is determined as a result of the
contract negotiation, but it is a popular way to formulate a contractual problem. The
dividend is determined as a residual when the rm chooses k0 and n0 given e; k and zp.
The future value of the rm in this problem is v^(e; k; zp), the value of the rm before it
decides continue/exit/default, because the maximization problem in the next period will
start with the discrete choice again.
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In this maximization problem, I assume that the rm must choose the asset size and
capital structure so that the liquidation value of the asset plus its deposit must be more
than the sum of the xed cost, cf , and the corporate income tax. That is,
(1  )(1  )k0 > cf + corporate income tax (3.5)
This assumption is needed to prevent rm's \wait and see" attitude. Without this assump-
tion, unproductive rms would wait one period without producing anything in order to
see their productivity in the next period rather than immediately exit from the economy,
and then the rm distribution would have a strange shape.10 This condition is basically a
technical assumption, but it can be interpreted as follows: The rm would not be trusted
by business partners and not be able to continue its business unless it has enough physical
assets to cover at least the xed cost and the corporate income tax payment.
3.1.5 New Entrants
Lastly, I characterize the optimization of new entrants. I assume that the potential entrants
can enter the economy freely, and their initial productivity follows a cumulative distribution
function, (z). Under the environment, they enter the economy if
Z
fzp:v(0;0;zp)>0g
v(0; 0; zp)d(zp)  ce (3.6)
10The rm prefers to take such an attitude because it does not have to pay anything including the xed
cost and the corporate income tax when the rm declares default. Therefore, the cost for waiting one
period is very little compared with its option value to wait.
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where ce is an entry cost. If the mass of entrants is positive, this condition should be
satised with equality. Otherwise, an innite number of rms would enter the economy.11
3.2 Financial Intermediary
The nancial intermediary (FI) takes an important role in the model. It receives deposit
from the representative household at risk-free rate, rf , and then it extends a business loan
to the rm through a one-period debt contract, (k n; r). Since the business loan is pooled
inside the representative FI, a law of large number works perfectly and the idiosyncratic
risks of the rms in the portfolio are vanished. As a result, since there is not an aggregate
uncertainty in the model, the risk premium of the portfolio is zero even though there is
the credit risk of each rm.
After they sign the contract, the lending business in the model proceeds as follows:
If the rm does not default, the FI simply would get (1 + r)(k   n) as is promised in
the debt contract. A complicated thing is the FI's response to defaulting rms. When
the rm declares default, rst, the FI would take everything from the rm. That is, it
would take the rm's prot, , and asset, (1   )k. Then, the FI has to pay a default
cost, which is proportional to the amount of asset, (1   )k. It represents the costs to
go through the default process including attorney fees.12 Lastly, the FI has to choose
11This setting is almost the same as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), but the timing of entry is a
little bit dierent from theirs. In their model, new entrants enter the economy after the exit decision by
incumbent rms and the entrants produce for at least one period regardless of their productivity. On the
other hand, in the current model, I assume that entrants enter the economy before the exit decision, and
the entrants may exit right after their entry without producing anything if the value for the rm's owner
is negative. This assumption about entrants is similar to that in Melitz (2003).
12As is easily shown, if the default cost does not exist, the existence of the FI would be almost irrelevant
to the rm's investment decision under an optimal contract. That is, the allocation would be the same as
the case that the rm can directly borrow money from the household at the risk-free rate.
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one of the following two options: provides the defaulting rm with a minimum nancial
support (i.e., debt forgiveness) in order for the rm to remain a going concern, or liquidates
the rm. Roughly speaking, the rst and second choice correspond to Chapter 11 and 7,
respectively.
As to the rst choice, the amount of the nancial support is denoted by b(k; zp), and
implicitly dened using the value function for the rm before the exogenous exit, v(e; k; zp),
as follows:
v(b(k; zp); k; zp) = 0 :
The equation means that when the rm's equity at the end of period is equal to b(k; zp), it
is indierent for the rm between exiting from the economy and continuing the business.
That is, the FI would increase the nancial support to the defaulting rm up to the point
where v(b(k; zp); k; zp) = 0, and make the rm continue its business. This response assumes
that the FI itself is not able to operate the business, and can be interpreted either that
the FI allows the defaulting rm to continue its business or that the FI takes the business
and sells it to another entity. On the other hand, when the FI chooses not to support the
rm but to liquidate it, the FI has to pay a liquidation cost, g(0; k), i.e., the downward
adjustment cost to decrease the amount of their asset to zero. Therefore, the FI selects
either of them by comparing b(k; zp) and g(0; k), and choose the smaller one.
I assume a competitive market for FIs. Since the FI's expected prot becomes zero
48
under this assumption, the FI can be reduced into the following zero prot condition:
(1 + rf )(k
0   n0) = Ez0pjzp
"Z x(z0p)

h
(k0; z0p; 
0; w0) + (1  )(1  )k0
 minb(k0; z0p); g(0; k0)	id(0)
+

1 (x(z0p))
  (1 + r0)(k0   n0)# (3.7)
The left hand side of the equation is the FI's funding cost. That is, the FI collects deposit
from the household at risk-free rate, rf . The right hand side is its expected earnings.
(0) is a cdf of the transitory productivity shock, 0. Given the cdf and the persistent
productivity, zp, a threshold of 
0 for default, x(zp), is dened as follows:
max fv(e(k; n;x  zp; r); k; zp) ; d(0; 0; e(k; n;x  zp; r); k)g = 0
This condition means that when the persistent productivity is equal to zp, the rm chooses
to default if and only if the transitory productivity shock, , is lower than x(zp).
13
The integral in the rst and second line of the right hand side represents the case of
default. As I explained, when the rm chooses to default, the FI takes all of the rm's
prot and asset, (k0; z0; w0)+(1 )(1 )k0.14 After it pays the default cost, (1 )k0, it
provides the minimum nancial support, b(k; zp), to make the rm remain a going concern,
or liquidates the rm by paying a liquidation cost, g(0; k). The third line of the right hand
side is the case that the rm pays back the loan and the interest as is promised in the debt
13Since both v(e(k; n; z; r); k; zp) and d(0; 0; e(k; n; z; r); k) are increasing functions with respect to , the
rm adopts a threshold policy rule.
14Note that since the rm optimally chooses to default, the return for the FI in the default case must be
lower than a nominal return of the debt.
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contract. Since the probability of this case is [1   (x(z0p))], the expected return is equal
to [1 (x(z0p))]  (1 + r0)(k0   n0).
The FI's zero prot condition is relevant to the real economy in the model, because the
rm solves the contract problem subject to this condition when it makes the investment
decision. That is, the rm optimally chooses the amount of its debt and the interest rate
applied to the debt subject to the zero prot condition for the FI.15
3.3 Household
I assume a representative household. It supplies labor force, Lst , to the rm and obtains
wage, wtL
s
t . Also, since the household owns all rms in the economy as a stockholder, it
gets the aggregate dividend, Dt, as another source of its income. It allocates the incomes
to the consumption, Ct, and savings at the FI, St, at the risk-free rate, rf . The budget
constraint is
Ct + St+1 = [1 + rf (1  i)]St +Dt + wtLst + Tt (3.8)
where i is the tax rate on the interest income and Tt is a lump sum transfer from the
government. The household maximizes its lifetime utility by consumption and labor supply.
I assume log-utility for consumption and liner disutility for labor supply for simplicity as
15Under standard parameter values, the prot for the rm and the FI move in opposite directions with
respect to the interest rate. Therefore, the zero prot condition would be always binding when the rm
optimally solves the contract problem. When the rm's productivity is very low and the amount of its debt
is big, there may not exit the interest rate to achieves zero prot for the FI. I assume that the rm must
decrease the amount of debt up to the point where the interest rate which achieves zero prot for the FI
exits.
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in Gomes (2001). Then the maximization problem for the household becomes
max
Lst ;St+1;Ct
E
1X
t=0
t[log(Ct) ALst ] (3.9)
subject to the budget constraint stated above.  is a discount factor. The rst order
conditions with respect to Lst and St+1 are as follows, respectively.
wt
Ct
= A and
1
Ct
= E
1 + rf (1  i)
Ct+1
(3.10)
In a quantitative part of this paper, I will focus only on a stationary equilibrium. Since all
aggregate variables and prices are constant in a stationary equilibrium, those rst order
conditions are rewritten as
w
C
= A and  =
1
1 + rf (1  i) (3.11)
and the budget constraint is
C = rf (1  i)S +D + wLs + T : (3.12)
In this budget constraint, D and T are exogenously given to the household. Then, given
these two values and wage, w, the household chooses C, S, and Ls. I will use the rst
order conditions and the budget constraint to compute a stationary equilibrium.
In the above formulation of the household problem, the share of each rm does not
show up in the budget constraint, and, as a result, the household is assumed not to choose
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the amount of the share at all and just get the aggregate dividend. Instead of assuming
that the aggregate dividend is distributed to the household in every period, I can formulate
the household problem so that the household chooses the amount of share in every period.
Since the household's behavior in the alternative formulation eventually gives the same
allocation in a stationary equilibrium, the dierence between the two formulations does
not matter for quantitative results.16
3.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions
Now that I complete the description of the individual rm behavior and the household
decision, I aggregate all rms and characterize a stationary equilibrium. In a stationary
equilibrium, since all prices and aggregate variables are constant by denition, wage, w,
can be dropped from the list of state variables. Then each rm can be specied by the
amount of equity, the amount of asset and the level of productivity, (e; k; zp). Let (e; k; zp)
16However, by explicitly formulating the endogenous choice of the share by the household, the following
two things, which are implicitly assumed in this paper, can be derived as a result of the household's
optimization. First, the return on equity is equal to the risk-free rate, 1 + rf (1   i), in equilibrium. It
sounds a little bit strange because it means that an equity premium is equal to zero, but it is a natural
consequence of the household's optimal portfolio choice without an aggregate uncertainty. Second, the
discount rate, , for the household is equal to that for the rm. In general, the rm's discount rate
should be stochastic when it is owned by the household, but in this paper, since I assume that there is no
aggregate uncertainty and focus just on a stationary equilibrium, the discount factor for the rm becomes
also constant and equal to .
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be the mass of rms at the state (e; k; zp). The law of motion of the rm distribution is
t+1(e
0; k0; z0p)
=
Z
(e;k;zp;;z0p)
8>><>>:
Ifx(z0p)g  Ife0=e(n;k;z0p)g  Ifk0=k(e;k;zp)g  (1  s1(e; k; z0p))
+If<x(z0p)g  Ife0=b(k0;z0p)g  Ifk0=k(e;k;zp)g  (1  s2(k; z0p))
9>>=>>;
 t(e; k; z)  Pr(z0pjzp)  d()dzpdkde
+ M
Z
zp
Ife0=e(n(0;0;z0p);k;z0p)g  Ifk0=k(0;0;z0p)g  (1  s3(z0p))d(z0p) (3.13)
where I is an indicator function that I = 1 if the inside of the brace is true. k and n are
the rm's optimal policy functions at the state (e; k; z) for asset and equity, respectively.
s1(e; k
0; z0p) and s2(k0; z0p) are indicator functions that they are equal to one when the rm
at the state (e; k0; z0p) chooses to exit from the economy in the case of default and not
default, respectively. Similarly, s3(z
0
p) is equal to one when the entrant chooses not to
enter the economy (i.e., exit from the economy immediately without producing anything).
e(n; k;  z0p) is the amount of equity at the end of period when the rm optimally chooses
the amount of asset, k, and the amount of equity, n, and the persistent and transitory
productivity are z0p and , respectively. The rst line of the inside of the integral represents
the case of default and the second line represents the case of not default. The last term of
the right hand side represents new entrants. M is the mass of the new entrants. Note that
the amount of equity and asset for the new entrants are zero. A stationary distribution is a
distribution  satisfying t+1 = t = . Practically, it is derived by starting an arbitrary
distribution and applying the above law of motion until the distribution converges to a
stationary distribution.
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Once we derive a stationary distribution, , the aggregate asset, equity, labor demand
and output is dened as follows:
Asset : K =
Z
k(e; k; zp)(e; k; zp)dedkdzp (3.14)
Equity : N =
Z
n(e; k; zp)(e; k; zp)dedkdzp (3.15)
Dividend : D =
Z
d(k(e; k; zp); n(e; k; zp); e; k)(e; k; zp)dedkdzp (3.16)
Labor Demand : Ld =
Z
l
 
k(e; k; zp); z0p

(e; k; zp)Pr(z
0
pjzp)d()dedkdz (3.17)
Output : Y =
Z 
z0pk
(e; k; zp)k l(k(e; k; zp); z0p)
l
  cf

(e; k; zp)Pr(z
0
pjzp)d()dedkdz (3.18)
Also the aggregate adjustment cost induced by frictions as follows:
Adj. Cost : G =
Z
g(k(e; k; zp); k)(e; k; zp)dedkdzp
+
Z
g(0; k(e; k; zp))
h
Ifx(z0p)g  s1(e; k; z0p) + If<x(z0p)g  s2(k; z0p)
i
 Pr(dz0pjzp)d()(e; k; z)dedkdz
+
Z
Ife<n(e;k;z0p)g(e
   n(e; k; z0p))(e; k; zp)Pr(z0pjzp)d()dedkdz
+
Z
If<x(z0p)gk
(e; k; zp)Pr(z0pjzp)d()dedkdz (3.19)
The rst line is the downward adjustment cost of asset. The second line is the liquidation
cost for exiting rms. The third line is the otation cost of equity and the fourth line is
the default cost. All costs are aggregated using a stationary distribution and assumed to
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be thrown away into the sea. The last aggregate variable is the tax revenue:
Tax Revenue : T =
Z
c  ((k; z0p; w)  k   r(k   n)  g(k(e; k; z0p); k))
 Pr(dz0pjzp)d()(e; k; z)dedkdz
+
Z
d  Ifd(k;n;e;k)>0g  d(k(e; k; zp); n(e; k; zp); e; k)(e; k; z)dedkdz
+
Z
i  rf  (K N)(e; k; zp)dedkdz (3.20)
Once the aggregate variables are dened, the next step to characterize the stationary
equilibrium is to dene market clearing conditions, which are satised in equilibrium. In the
economy, there are three markets: labor, consumption goods and saving, and all markets
should clear in a stationary competitive equilibrium. First, the market clearing condition
for the saving market is
S = K N (3.21)
The left hand side is the saving by the representative household and the right hand side is
the aggregate debt owned by rms. This equation means that all savings are used as debt
in the rm's balance sheet. Next, the market clearing condition for the labor market is
Ls = Ld (3.22)
Lastly, the market clearing condition for the consumption goods market is dened as
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follows.
C = Y  K G (3.23)
This condition says that the aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate output minus
the depreciation of asset and the adjustment costs stemming from frictions. Note that the
aggregate corporate investment in a stationary equilibrium is equal to the depreciation
of asset. Therefore, K is the amount of equilibrium investment, and the gross domestic
product (GDP) is dened in the model as follows.
GDP = C + K
Thus, GDP is also equal to the aggregate output minus the aggregate adjustment costs.
3.5 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
Finally, I close the model by charactering a stationary competitive equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of (1) allocation rules of la-
bor, saving, and consumption for the household, Ls(D;T;w), S(D;T;w), and C(D;T;w),
(2) allocation rules of labor, asset, and equity for each rm, l(k; zp; w), k(e; k; zp; w),
and n(e; k; zp; w), (3) an continue/exit/default decision for each rm, h(e; k; zp), (4)
value functions for each rm, v^(e; k; zp), v(e; k; zp), and ~v(e; k; zp), (5) aggregate variables,
K;N;Ld;D, Y;G, and T, (6) a wage rate, w, and a lending rate, r, (7) a stationary
distribution, (e; k; zp), and mass of entrants, M , such that:
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1. the household decision rules satisfy its FOCs and the budget constrait;
2. the rm decision rules, a lending rate, and value functions solve the maximization
problems for each rm;
3. the market clearing conditions are satised;
4. the free-entry condition is satised;
5. the aggregation rules (i.e., consistency) are satised;
6. the stationary distribution, , satises the law of motion with t+1 = t = .
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Chapter 4
Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, I compute a stationary competitive equilibrium. To begin with, I calibrate
the model using empirical results or so that the model accounts for some moments of
the U.S. data. After the calibration, I numerically compute a stationary equilibrium and
describe the properties of the stationary equilibrium.
4.1 Calibration
I set one period in the model to one year. Since I have already specied functional forms of
most functions in the model, the rest that I have to do is to specify the parameter values.
I start with relatively standard parameters. I set the risk-free rate, rf , to 4%. It is a
little higher than the risk-free rate in the real economy, but since the equity premium is
equal to zero in the model due to the lack of aggregate uncertainty, this return is interpreted
as a more general return in the economy. By the Euler equation of the household, the
discount rate for the household, , is equal to 1=(1 + rf (1   i)) because I just focus
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on a stationary equilibrium. In the baseline model, wage, w, is set to 1.0 and the labor
disutility parameter, A, is chosen so that an equilibrium labor supply is equal to 0.6, which
is an average employment rate in the U.S., as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). For
technology parameters, rst I choose the degree of diminishing returns, k+l. This varies
across previous works, but I set the parameter to 0.85 as in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) and
Veracierto (2002). Then I set k so that the aggregate investment-output ratio is equal to
16%. k = 0:25 gives the target value of the aggregate investment-output ratio, and then
l = 0:85  0:25 = 0:6. Finally, I set  = 0:078 so that the aggregate capital-output ratio
in the stationary equilibrium is equal to 2.0. The target investment-output ratio and the
target capital-output ratio are taken from NIPA data for the last 15 years in the U.S.
Next, I set the values of the friction parameters, which are relatively specic to the
current model. First, I set the otation cost of equity funding to  = 0:059 according to the
estimation in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Next, I calibrate the downward adjustment
cost of asset, . Actually, the estimation of the adjustment cost varies among empirical
works.1 Among them, Hennessy and Whited (2005) structurally estimates the cost using
COMPUSTAT data. They conclude that the cost is about 41% and I adopt their estimation
value in this paper, i.e., I set (1 c) = 0:41. I adopt their estimate, not only because this
is around the median value among empirical estimates, but also because this paper is close
to their model and uses COMPUSTAT as a target too. The last parameter is the default
cost, . \Doing Business" database at the World Bank collects default costs all over the
world. According to the database, a default cost in the U.S. is about 7% of defaulting
1As a lower bound of the estimation, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimates the cost using rm micro
data and concludes that the cost is about 20% of asset. As the upper bound of the estimation, Ramey and
Shapiro (2001) estimates the cost using aero space industry data. According to their estimation, the cost
varies among the types of assets, but it is around 60%.
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Table 4.1: Calibration
Parameters Values
Discount rate,  0.966 Risk free rate = 0.04
Labor disutility, A 1.25 labor supply = 0.6
Return to scale, k + l 0.85 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
Technology, k 0.25 Investment/Output = 0.16
Depreciation,  0.078 Capital/Output = 2.0
Scrapping cost,  0.41 Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Equity funding cost,  0.059 Hennessy and Whited (2005)
Default cost,  0.07 Estimate by World Bank
rm's estate value, and so I set  = 0:07. The parameters up to this point is summarized
in Table 4.1.
As to the tax rates in the model, I set the dividend tax rate, d, and the interest income
tax rate, i, to 12% and 29.6%, respectively, according to Graham (2000). I also set the
corporate income tax rate, hc , to 35% for rms with positive prot according to Graham
(2000), but, on the other hand, I set the corporate income tax rate for rms with negative
prot,  lc, to 20% because the corporate income tax system in many countries including
the U.S. adopts a progressive tax rate system. While rms with negative prot do not pay
any corporate income tax in the real economy, I choose non-zero tax rate because the loss
in the current period will be deducted from the future taxable income. In that sense, I set
the corporate income tax rate for exiting rms with negative prot to zero because their
loss will never be deducted from their taxable income in the future. This corporate income
tax system is still too simplied compared with the real tax system, but this is rich enough
to capture the progressivity in the corporate income tax system in the real economy and
aects the quantitative results later. The tax rates used in the model are summarized in
Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Tax Rates
Parameters Values
Corporate incomes, c
Current prot > 0, hc 0.35
Current prot < 0, hc 0.20
Dividends, d 0.12
Interest incomes, i 0.296
In this paper, there are two types of rm exit: exogenous and endogenous exit. In the
model, only small rms exit from the economy endogenously or through default because
rm size and productivity are positively correlated. As I mentioned, the exogenous exit is
introduced in order to capture the fact that large rms exit from the economy. Therefore,
I calibrate the exogenous exit rate, , to 2%, which is the exit rate for rms with more
than 150,000 employees in COMPUSTAT. Given this exogenous exit rate, the value of the
xed cost, I calibrate the xed cost, cf , so that the total exit rate including the exogenous
one is equal to 7%, which is a total exit rate calculated by COMPUSTAT in the last 5
years.2
For the productivity distribution of entrants, (zp), I assume that the distribution is
the normal distribution. Then, the parameters to be specied are the mean and variance
of the distribution. First, I set the mean of the entrant's productivity distribution to the
unconditional mean of productivity, =1   , as in Gomes (2001). Given this value of
mean, I calibrate the variance of the entrant's productivity distribution so that the size
distribution of entrants matches that in COMPUSTAT.
2Someone may notice that this is lower than the exit rate computed by the U.S. Census data, which
is around 9%. This dierence stems from the fact that COMPUSTAT consists of relatively good rms
because this database contains only listed rms in the U.s. I assume that rms exit from the economy at
period t if they existed in period t  1, but they do not exist in period t. Of course, there are other reasons
for them to disappear from the database such as mergers or stopping listing, but I think that the value is
a rough proxy for the exit rate.
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Finally, I should set parameter values regarding the stochastic process of two types of
productivity. First, the unconditional mean of the persistent productivity shock, , is
chosen so that the average rm size measured by the number of employees matches that in
COMPUSTAT. The rm size can be used as a target value because the size and productivity
are strongly correlated. Next, to calibrate the productivity processes, I utilize the fact that
the autocorrelation process of labor is very persistent while the capital structure process
is less persistent. First, I calibrate the AR(1) parameter  and the standard deviation 
so that the autocorrelation of labor process and the standard deviation of residuals in this
autocorrelation process match those in COMPUSTAT. This procedure is the same as in
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that they use establishment data rather than rm
data. Then I choose  = 0:97 and  = 0:115. Second, given those parameter values for the
persistent productivity process, I adjust the standard deviation of transitory productivity,
, so that the autocorrelation process of leverage matches that in COMPUSTAT. The
autocorrelation process of rm's leverage is less persistent than that of labor, but it is also
fairly persistent as Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) shows. Thus I set the value of the
standard deviation small enough to account for the leverage process. I choose  = 0:35.
Under the value, the leverage process is close to data in terms of AR(1) parameter and the
standard deviation of residuals.3 After I set all parameter values, I discretize the AR(1)
process of persistent productivity, log(zp;t) =  log(zp;t 1) + t where t  N(; ), by
Tauchen's method.
3The autocorrelation and the standard deviation of residuals are 0.83 and 0.14 in the data and 0.83 and
0.15 in the model.
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4.2 Results
In this subsection I compute a stationary equilibrium and describe some properties of the
equilibrium. In particular, I describe the following four things: dispersion of leverage,
the rm's policy functions, distribution of rm size and productivity, and relationship of
leverage to rm size. The algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium is based on
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and it is summarized in Appendix A.
4.2.1 Distribution of Leverage
Does the model account for the dispersion of leverage observed in data? This question
itself is an interesting economic question because logic behind the widespread distribution
of corporate capital structure is not fully investigated, but it is also a good rst step
to check the model t. If the model cannot account for the dispersion of leverage, it
does not seem meaningful to use the model for other purposes including counterfactual
experiments. I calculate the equilibrium distribution of leverage in the model using the
stationary distribution, (e; k; zp). I use COMPUSTAT as the data source in this paper.
See Appendix C for more detail about the data and denitions of variables.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are the histograms of the rms' leverage in the model and the
data.4 While the dispersion is more widespread in the model, I conclude that the model
successfully accounts for the distribution of leverage in the data. In particular, the model's
equilibrium distribution captures the following two key features in the data: rst, a lot
of rms take very low leverage, and, second, some rms take very high leverage and, as a
4In both histograms, \Average" means the simple average of rms' leverage and \Aggregate" means the
aggregate equity divided by the aggregate debt plus equity.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of Leverage (Data)
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of Leverage (Model)
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result, the distribution is very widespread.
4.2.2 Firm's Optimal Behavior
To know the mechanisms behind the equilibrium distribution of leverage, it is helpful to
explore the rm's optimal behavior. Figure 4.3 is a 3-dimensional graph showing the
optimal choice of asset. The X and Y axes are the amount of equity at the end of period,
e, and the productivity, zp, respectively. Some comments are in order. First, the optimal
amount of asset is monotonically increasing with respect to the rm's productivity, but
it is barely aected by the amount of equity except rms with very low productivity.
Since the equity is a main source of their internal funding, this policy function implies
that the outside nancing constraint aects only very unproductive rm's investment, and
irrelevant to most rms' investment. This policy function of asset is consistent with the
recent ndings about the rm size distribution. Angelini and Generale (2008) uses Italian
rm data and argues that the nancial constraints are important only for small rms, but
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play little role for determining the rm size distribution as a whole.Second, there is an
inaction area where the optimal amount of asset is at, which is common for the model
with investment irreversibility. This feature makes the rm size deviate from the optimal
one and the adjustment of rm size sluggish.
Figure 4.4 shows the policy function of equity, nt+1, with respect to the amount of
equity at the end of the previous period, et. The dotted line is the policy function for
a low productivity rm and the solid one is that for a high productivity rm. First, we
notice that the optimal amount of equity is close to the 45 degree line in most cases for
both a low and a high productivity rm. This behavior implies that the rm uses its
internal fund as much as possible for investment, and lls its nancing decit (the gap
between investment and the amount of internal funding) mainly by debt. This behavior
is basically consistent with empirical results (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and
Leary and Roberts (2005)). As is pointed by Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Frank
and Goyal (2008), even though the nancing behavior in a dynamic trade o model is
mostly determined by the trade o between the tax benet and the nancial distress costs,
the resulting behavior looks similar to the implication of the pecking order theory. I will
investigate which frictions play a key role to induce such a nancing behavior through
counterfactual experiments in later sections.
Another noticeable thing is that the rm uses the outside equity only if its productivity
is low (i.e., rm size is small) and the amount of internal funding is small. It is basically
consistent with the empirical ndings by Leary and Roberts (2010), which argues that
rms issuing new outside equity by violating the pecking order are small, less protable
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and much less leveraged.5 The lending rates for rms with dierent productivities give
some intuitions behind this behavior. Figure 4.6 shows the lending rate in the optimal
contract. The horizontal axis is the rm's leverage. The doted, dashed and solid line is the
lending rate for the low, middle and high productivity rm, respectively.6 It shows that
the lending rate is increasing with respect to leverage. In particular, it shows that it is
very costly for a low productivity rm to increase leverage. Due to such a high lending rate
for a low productivity rm, the rm would decrease its leverage by increasing the outside
equity funding up to the point where it can use debt nance at reasonable lending rate.7
Figure 4.6 also shows that a high productivity rm can use debt nance almost at risk-free
rate. It implies that a high productivity rm accumulates its internal funding only due to
the precautionary motive.
Considering those properties of equilibrium lending rates and leverage, the rm's opti-
mal choice of leverage is basically consistent with the survey data in Graham and Harvey
(2001). CFOs in the survey answer that the most important determinants of corporate
capital structure are \credit ratings" and \nancial exibility." The credit ratings seem
relevant to corporate capital structure in this model because taking high leverage induces
high credit spread in the model. Moreover, the nancial exibility also seems relevant in
this model because it exactly corresponds to precautionary motive to accumulate internal
5See also Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender (2009) for similar results.
6Someone may notice that the level of credit spreads is small for all rms compared with the data. Those
tight credit spreads in this model are not surprising because aggregate uncertainty is not incorporated in
this model. Actually some papers such as Gomes and Schmid (2010) and Chen (2010) argue that aggregate
uncertainty is a key component to account for a plausible level of credit spread. Incorporating aggregate
uncertainty to account for the level of credit spreads is an interesting extension of this model.
7In equilibrium, a defaulting rm is often in such a situation. That is, the defaulting rm gets some
debt forgiveness from the FI, but, at the same time, it must get some outside equity in order to borrow
money from the FI at reasonable lending rate. I think that such a simultaneous debt and outside equity
nance for nancially distressed rms is common in the real economy.
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Figure 4.5: Policy Function of Leverage
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Figure 4.5 shows the policy function of leverage, (kt+1   nt+1)=kt+1. The horizontal
axis is the amount of equity, et. Again, the dotted line is the policy function for a low
productivity rm and the solid one is that for a high productivity rm. First, it shows
that a high productivity rm is more leveraged. There are two reasons. The rst reason
is that the optimal asset size of the high productivity rm is larger and the nancing
decit is usually lled by debt. The second reason is that debt is more accessible for
8Graham and Harvey (2001) states that \they remain exible in the sense of minimizing interest obli-
gations, so that they do no need to shrink their business in case of an economic downturn."
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the high productivity rm than the low productivity rm because the equilibrium lending
rate is low. Second, it shows that the policy functions of leverage are decreasing with
respect to the amount of equity, et. This is because the rm can use et as its internal
funding and decrease leverage. This policy function of leverage gives a rough logic behind
the stationary distribution of leverage: Because the average prot of incumbent rms is
positive (otherwise, they choose to exit from the economy), they accumulate its internal
funding and decrease their leverage as time goes on. This is why there are many rms with
very low leverage in the stationary equilibrium. On the other hand, rms with low internal
funding and high productivity take high leverage. For example, if the rm is suddenly hit
by a good productivity shock or if the rm is so young that it does not have enough time to
accumulate internal funding, it would be highly leveraged. It means that rms' evolution
with entry/exit is an important mechanism to account for the dispersion of leverage in
data.
4.2.3 Firm Size and Productivity
Next, I describe the rm size and its productivity. Figure 4.7 represents the stationary
joint distribution of asset size and productivity. The horizontal axis is the amount of assets
in log-scale and the vertical axis is productivities. There is a clear positive relationship
between them. That is, productive rms own more assets (i.e., get larger) than less pro-
ductive ones do. While this positive correlation between rm size and productivity is very
intuitive, it plays an important role in a quantitative part of this paper.
Figure 4.8 - 4.10 are the marginal stationary distributions of the rm's productivity,
asset, and equity, respectively. The distribution of productivity is slightly skewed to right
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because low productivity rms cannot survive and only high productivity rms stay in the
economy. That is, the cleansing eect through entry/exit works as a mechanism to shape
the stationary distribution in the model. The distribution of equity is less skewed compared
with the distribution of asset, and so the distribution of leverage is skewed rightward.
4.2.4 Firm Age and Leverage
Finally, I briey describe the relationship between rm age and capital structure. As many
papers including Cooley and Quadrini (2001) argue, young rms use more debt than old
rms. This is the case in the current model too. Figure 4.11 shows the fraction of entrants
and rms older than 10 years in each category of leverage. It shows that while the fraction
of entrants decreases as the leverage increases, the fraction of rms older than 10 years
increases as the leverage increases. For example, while half of zero leveraged rms are
rms older than 10 years, less than 5% of them are entrants. The tendency that young
rms use more debt than old rms plays a key role in counterfactual experiments later.
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Figure 4.11: Firm Age and Leverage
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Chapter 5
Model Implication
In this section, I show some implications of the model. First, I explore the logic behind
the relationship of leverage to rm size and protability. I review the stylized facts about
the relationships, and then check whether the model account for them by the joint distri-
butions of rm's characteristics and the estimation using articial data generated from the
stationary distribution.
Next, I conduct some counterfactual experiments. In the experiments, I focus on the
following two questions. First, I measure the relative importance between determinants
of the rm's capital structure by changing the degree of each friction. Second, I measure
the eect of the corporate income tax and the default cost on aggregate variables such as
output, consumption, and so forth.
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5.1 Relationship of Leverage to Firm Size and Protability
In this subsection I explore the logic behind the empirical relationship of leverage to rm
size and protability. In order to measure the relationship, rst, I compare the joint
distribution of the rm's characteristics in the model with that in the data. Then I conduct
some regressions using the articial data generated from the stationary distribution, and
compare the estimation results with those using the real economic data.
5.1.1 Joint Distributions of Firm's Characteristics
First, I look at the joint distribution of protability and rm size. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 show
the relationship between ROA and log of employment size in the data and the model,
respectively. The both gures show similar \economies of scale." That is, ROAs of large
rms are higher than those of small rms. Moreover, the larger the rm size is, the slighter
the economies of scale are. This feature is not surprising because the economies of scale
are induced just by the xed cost, cf .
Second, I look at the joint distribution of leverage and rm size. Figure 5.3 and 5.4
show the relationship between the book leverage and log of employment size in the data and
the model, respectively. The both gures show moderately positive correlation between
them.
Third, I look at the joint distribution of leverage and protability. Figure 5.5 and 5.6
show the relationship between the book leverage and ROA in the data and the model,
respectively. Those gures show that rms with very low ROA are ones with very low
leverage. Those extreme rms seem to induce the positive relationship between leverage
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and protability. Since Figure 5.1 and 5.2 tell us that those rms all are also small rms,
I may be able to eliminate the eects of those rms by controlling for rm size.
5.1.2 Estimation Results
In this subsection I estimate the following reduced form equations, which are familiar in
the empirical corporate nance1:
Book Leveragei = 0 + 1 log(Employeei) + i (5.1)
Book Leveragei = 0 + 1ROAi + i (5.2)
Book Leveragei = 0 + 1ROAi + 2 log(Employeei) + i (5.3)
where i represents each rm. In the rst and second equations, I estimate the plain
relationship of leverage to rm size and protability, respectively. The number of employees
and ROA are used as proxies for rm size and protability. In the last equation, I estimate
the eect of rm size and protability on leverage after controlling for the other variable.
As econometricians usually put many explanatory variable at a time to measure their
marginal eect, the last equation is the most familiar equation in the empirical corporate
nance literature.
Estimation Using Real Data
Table 5.1 shows the results of estimation using the real economic data. First, it shows
that the simple correlation between leverage and rm size in data is positive, which is
consistent with previous empirical papers. Second, it shows that the simple correlation
1Those equations are similar to those in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002)
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Figure 5.1: ROA and Employment Size (Data) Figure 5.2: ROA and Employment Size (Model)
Figure 5.3: Leverage and Employment Size (Data) Figure 5.4: Leverage and Employment Size (Model)
Figure 5.5: Leverage and ROA (Data) Figure 5.6: Leverage and ROA (Model)
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between leverage and protability is also positive. Since previous empirical papers do not
focus on such a simple correlation between them, the positive correlation may be a little
bit surprising. The coecient on ROA, however, turns out to be negative when I estimate
the same equation using only large rm data, whose size is larger than the average. The
result is consistent with previous empirical papers including Rajan and Zingales (1995),
which points out that the relationship between leverage and protability becomes negative
as rm size gets large. Finally, when I estimate the relationships of leverage to rm size
and protability simultaneously, the coecient on protability turns out to be negative
too.
The negative relationship between leverage and protability after controlling for other
rm characteristics has attracted attentions of many academic researchers because it is
dicult to justify the negativity by the traditional static trade o theory. For example,
Graham (2000) calculates the tax benets for each rm, and argues that protable and
liquid rms puzzlingly have low leverage. Hennessy and Whited (2005) accounts for the
negative relationship by a dynamic trade of model. Their result is striking in this literature,
but they do not mention the relationship of leverage to rm size. Thus they do not
mention the eect of rm size on the negative relationship too. Strebulaev (2007) adopts
a similar quantitative method to this paper and accounts for the negative relationship
by incorporating the cost to rebalance the rm's capital structure. The mechanism in his
model is clear and plausible, but as I explained in Introduction, it is doubtful that the model
still accounts for the negative relationship when the rm's nancing decit endogenously
responses to its productivity.
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Table 5.1: Estimate Results
Data
Variable Book Leverage
log(Employee) 0.026 { (Large rms only) 0.030
[0.025 0.027] [0.029 0.031]
ROA { 0.068 -0.334 -0.066
[0.059 0.077] [-0.356 -0.312] [-0.076 -0.057]
Model
Variable Book Leverage
log(Employee) 0.019 { (Large rms only) 0.021
[0.017 0.021] [0.019 0.024]
ROA { 0.024 -0.109 -0.037
[0.013 0.036] [-0.137 -0.082] [-0.050 -0.024]
As the real economic data, I use pooling panel data of COMPUSTAT in a recent 20 years. See Appendix
C for more detail. When I estimate by the real economic data, I add the time dummy for each year and
the industry dummy based on SIC code. When I estimate by the model output, I randomly draw 5,000
samples from the stationary distribution. I drop observations as outliers if their ROA is more than upper
3% tile or less than lower 3% tile. \Large rms only" means that I drop the observation from the dataset
if the rm size is smaller than the average.
Estimation Using Model Output
In order to estimate the same equations using the model output, I adopt the following
two step procedure: First, I randomly draw articial data from the equilibrium stationary
distribution. Then, I conduct the regressions using the articial data. This procedure is
the same as in Gomes (2001).
Table 5.1 shows the estimation results using the articial data from the stationary
distribution. The magnitudes of the coecients are slightly dierent from those in the
estimation using the real economic data, but the estimation using the model output repli-
cates the sign of coecients. That is, the coecient on rm size and protability is positive
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when I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and those variables, but the coef-
cient on protability turns out to be negative once I limit the data to large rms or once
I control for rm size.
5.1.3 The Logic behind the Estimation Results
What is the logic behind the estimation results? There are two key mechanisms to under-
stand the estimation results. The rst key mechanism is the dierence between responses
to the persistent and the transitory productivity shock: While the persistent productivity
shock can either increase or decrease leverage, the transitory productivity shock decrease
leverage.
Let me explain the relationship between the persistent productivity shock and leverage.
On the one hand, rms with high persistent productivity tend to bemore leveraged because
the positive productivity shock increases their optimal asset size (and, as a result, increases
their nancing decit) as well as it makes debt nance more accessible under the trade
o. It is easy to check the mechanisms by comparing the optimal leverage between a high
and a low productivity rm in Figure 4.5. On the other hand, rms with high persistent
productivity tend to be less leveraged because they have ample cash ow and use it as
internal funding. It is easy to check the mechanism by the fact that the policy function of
leverage is decreasing with respect to the amount of equity in Figure 4.5. As a result of
these two forces in opposite directions, the eect of the persistent productivity on leverage
is ambiguous in general. However, the positive eect is quantitatively larger than the
negative one, and so the correlation between the persistent productivity and leverage is
positive for most rms.
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In contrast, the transitory productivity shock just increases the amount of internal
funding in the current period, but it obviously does not aect its optimal asset size and
nancing decit. Therefore, it just decreases its leverage.
The other key mechanism behind the estimation is the economies of scale (i.e., positive
correlation between protability measured by ROA and rm size) caused by the xed cost,
cf . Actually, without the xed cost, the relationship between ROA and rm size would
be ambiguous and almost uncorrelated, because both the denominator and the numerator
of ROA (i.e., rm size and EBITDA) would increase as the persistent productivity, zp,
increases. With the xed cost, however, ROA and rm size are positively correlated be-
cause the rm's EBITDA would increase faster than its size as the persistent productivity
increases.
In summary, the eects of two dierent productivities on leverage are
Corr(lev; zp) > 0 & Corr(lev; ) < 0 (5.4)
where lev is the rm's leverage, zp is the persistent productivity, and  is the transitory
productivity. The economies of scale induces
Corr(fs;ROA) > 0 (5.5)
where fs is rm size.
Then, the logic behind the estimation results can be understood as follows. First, the
positive correlation between leverage and rm size is induced by the positive correlation
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between persistent productivity, zp, and rm size, which is shown in Figure 4.7, because
Corr(lev; zp) > 0 & Corr(zp; fs) > 0 ) Corr(lev; fs) > 0
Intuitively, because rms with high persistent productivity get large and increase their
leverage simultaneously, some kind of spurious correlation between rm size and leverage
shows up.
Next, I consider the relationship between leverage and protability. The protability
measured by ROA could be positively correlated with leverage due to the positive correla-
tion between rm size and leverage and the economies of scale,
Corr(lev; fs) > 0 & Corr(fs;ROA) > 0 ) Corr(lev;ROA) > 0 :
On the other hand, the protability could be negatively correlated with leverage through
the transitory productivity, ,
Corr(lev; ) < 0 & Corr(;ROA) > 0 ) Corr(lev;ROA) < 0
Note that the transitory productivity, , and ROA are positively correlated because the
transitory productivity increases the rm's prot (numerator) but does not aect the rm
size (denominator) at all.
When I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and ROA, the sign is am-
biguous in general because of the potential positive and negative correlations stated above.
However, both in the data and the model, the positive eect seems dominant because the
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persistent productivity aects the rm's behavior more than the transitory productivity
does. Then we obtain
Corr(lev;ROA) > 0
both in the data and the model.
When I estimate the simple correlation between leverage and ROA using only large rm
data, ROA is almost independent of rm size because the economies of scale caused by the
xed cost, cf , become less relevant as rm size gets larger. Therefore, only the negative
correlation between leverage and ROA through the transitory productivity remains, and
then I obtain
Corr(lev;ROA) < 0
both in the data and the model.
Similarly, when I regress leverage on rm size and ROA, the rm size absorbs the
positive eect of ROA on leverage. Therefore, ROA captures only the negative eect
through the transitory productivity, and so the coecient on protability turns out to be
negative, and I obtain
Corr(lev;ROA) < 0
both in the data and the model.
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5.2 Cross Sectional Determinants of the Firm's Capital Struc-
ture
What is the key determinant of the rm's capital structure? This is a recurrent question
in the corporate nance literature. In this subsection I try to answer this question through
counterfactual experiments. The experiment is divided into two parts: First, I explore
what makes the rm use debt nance. To answer the question, I drop the advantage of
debt one by one, and see how the average and aggregate leverage would change. Second,
I explore what makes the rm use equity. To answer this question, I drop the advantages
of equity one by one. Finally, I summarize the implications of this experiment.
5.2.1 What Makes Firms Use Debt?
What makes the rm use debt rather than equity? The most natural guess is the tax benet
generated by the gap between the corporate income tax rate and the interest income tax
rate. Therefore, as the rst experiment, I lower the corporate income tax rate to 28%,
which is lower than the interest income tax rate, 29.6%, and recalculate the stationary
equilibrium. It is expected that the rm's leverage would signicantly decrease because
there is no tax benet under this corporate income tax rate. Table 5.2 shows the rm's
average and aggregate leverage in the new stationary equilibrium. The result is a little
bit counterintuitive. It shows that the rm's leverage would decrease a little, but the
magnitude of the change in leverage is very small. This result is in contrast to previous
works. For example, Hennessy and Whited (2005) states in their counterfactual experiment
that:
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Table 5.2: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverage
hc 
l
c + d   Average Aggregate
Baseline 0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.34 0.29
0.28 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.33 0.26
0.28 0.20 0.0 0.07 0.41 0.00 0.00
0.35 0.20 0.0 0.07 0.41 0.23 0.51
When we lower the maximal corporate tax rate below the tax rate on interest
income, we nd that the rm always retains funds and only nances with equity.
This contrast stems from the assumption about rms' entry/exit. That is, without rms'
entry/exit as a standard dynamic trade o model, all rms would eventually use 100%
equity by accumulating retained earnings if the tax benet did not exist. However, with
rms' entry/exit like this paper, young rms always exist in a stationary distribution and
use debt in the process of their evolution as long as outside equity is more costly than
debt. This can be checked by Figure 4.11, which shows young rms use more debt than
old rms. This result of counterfactual experiment implies that frictions in outside equity
caused by the dividend tax and the otation cost of equity are also important for capital
structure. It may answer the question why debt nance was popular nancing tool before
the corporate income tax was introduced.
Next, as the second experiment, I eliminate the dividend tax and the otation cost of
equity in addition to the tax benet. That is, I set  + d = 0 in addition to c = 28%.
The result is consistent with what we expect. Since the rm has no incentive to use debt,
it uses no debt and the average and aggregate leverage in equilibrium become zero.
Do the results up to this point imply that the otation cost of equity and the dividend
tax are the main reasons to use debt? It is not so simple. As the third experiment, I set
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+ d = 0, but turn the corporate income tax rate back to c = 35%. The result is a little
bit puzzling. The average leverage decreases as is expected, but the aggregate leverage
increases. The dierent responses between the average and aggregate leverage imply that
small rms use less debt while big rms use more.
To understand the logic behind the result, it is helpful to summarize the eect of +d,
the otation cost of equity and the dividend tax, on leverage.2 As I explained, the rm's
optimal behavior in this model is like the behavior implied by the pecking order theory:
Internal Fund  Debt  Outside Equity
and, the claim here is that + d induces this preference order. This claim is not new, but
was pointed by Stiglitz (1973). First, let me explain why the otation cost of equity and
the dividend tax make rms prefer debt to outside equity. The reason why the otation
cost of outside equity makes rms use debt is straightforward. As for the dividend tax,
please imagine the situation where the rm got $100 funding in the past and is now paying
it back with $20 prot. If the rm got the $100 as debt, it would pay back $120  i$20,
but if the rm got it as outside equity, it would pay back only $120 (1  d). Therefore,
with d > 0, outside equity would be costly compared with debt. Next, I explain why the
otation cost of equity and the dividend tax make rms use debt rather than inside equity.
Imagine that the rm has $100 as its cash ow. The rm's rst choice is to keep it as its
internal fund. The second choice is to pay it back to the household as the dividend and
nance investment by debt. If  + d > 0, the rm would hesitate to choose the second
2As is easily shown, both the otation cost and the dividend tax are like transaction costs of outside
equity funding, and so the relevant thing is the sum of them, + d.
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one (i.e., pay dividend and use debt nance) because the rm may be in nancial distress
and need the money. That is, if the rm do not have enough internal funding in the case
of nancial distress, the rm would have to use outside equity, which is very costly under
 + d > 0, to deal with the nancial distress. Thus, the otation cost of equity and the
dividend tax make rms keep more internal fund for the precautionary reason. In that
sense, + d can be interpreted as a kind of nancial distress cost because outside equity
funding is one of ways to deal with nancial distress. If + d = 0, nancial distress would
not be so serious problem for the rm because the rm uses outside equity funding to pay
back its debt.
As a whole, the eect of  + d on leverage is ambiguous in general because they
encourage the rm to use more internal funding rather than debt, but encourage the rm
to use debt rather than outside equity. However, the relative magnitude depends on the
rm's nancial position. + d tends to increase leverage of rich rms because the choice
between internal funding and debt is more relevant for them. On the other hand,  + d
tends to decrease leverage for poor rms because the choice between debt and outside
equity funding is more relevant for them. Since the rm size is strongly correlated with its
nancial position, the dierence in the relative magnitude induces the dierent responses
between the average and aggregate leverage in the experiment.
5.2.2 What Makes Firms Use Equity?
The second question in the experiment is why the rm uses equity rather than debt.
To answer the question, I drop frictions which make the rm use equity, and recalculate
the stationary equilibrium. The most natural guess is the default cost, . It makes debt
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unattractive because the equilibrium lending rate is determined considering the endogenous
default and its cost. Therefore, as the rst experiment, I set the default cost to zero,
 = 0. As a result of this change, it is expected that the rm's leverage would signicantly
increase. Table 5.3 shows that when the default cost is eliminated, the rm's leverage
is almost doubled (Average: 31% ! 61%). Some papers assume that a risk-free bond
without default is an only choice of debt nance, but the result of the experiment implies
that a default cost is an important determinant of capital structure, and the risk-free bond
approach is not a good approach to discuss corporate capital structure.
As the next experiment, I increase the corporate tax rate for rms with negative cor-
porate income,  lc, from 20% to 35%. By doing so, I eliminate the tax disbenet for
unprotable rms. The tax disbenet for unprotable rms emerges because the corpo-
rate income tax rate for them is usually lower than the interest income rate due to the
progressive tax rate system. Table 5.3 shows that the average and aggregate leverage in-
crease as is expected (Average: 31% ! 50%). The result implies that the tax disbenet
is also an important determinant making rms use equity.
When I eliminate both the default cost and the tax disbenet, rm's leverage increases
to 75%. What else makes rms use equity? The answer is the wedge in equity funding
caused by the otation cost of equity and the dividend tax,  + d. Thus I eliminate the
otation cost of equity and the dividend tax,  + d, as the next experiment. The result
shows that the average and aggregate leverage becomes more than 90%, almost equal to
one, because there is no reason to use equity.3
The result of the experiment up to this point implies that even if the investment
3It is not equal to one because of the constraint (3.5). When I eliminate the constraint, the average
leverage becomes one.
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Table 5.3: Changes in Average and Aggregate Leverage
hc 
l
c + d   Average Aggregate
Baseline 0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.34 0.29
0.35 0.20 0.179 0.0 0.41 0.61 0.39
0.35 0.35 0.179 0.07 0.41 0.50 0.46
0.35 0.35 0.179 0.0 0.41 0.75 0.62
0.35 0.35 0.0 0.0 0.41 0.91 0.99
0.35 0.20 0.179 0.07 0.21 0.48 0.44
irreversibility exists (i.e.,  > 0), the rm's leverage would become close to one once
 = 0,  + d = 0, and 
l
c > i. It is a little bit surprising because some papers including
Hennessy and Whited (2005) emphasize the investment irreversibility as a main nancial
distress cost. Does the result of the counterfactual experiment imply that the investment
irreversibility is not an important determinant? Table 5.3 shows it is not true, but that
if the investment irreversibility is mitigated, the average and aggregate leverage would
substantially increase. It implies that the investment irreversibility has a strong eect
on the rm's leverage as long as it coexists with other frictions. The intuition is that if
+d = 0, the rm does not have to conduct any re sale of asset to deal with the nancial
distress because outside equity is a cheap way to deal with the nancial distress. However,
if  + d > 0, the re sale becomes the cheapest way to deal with the nancial distress
and the degree of investment irreversibility become a relevant determinant for the rm's
capital structure choice.
Let me summarize the implications of the counterfactual experiments. First, even
if the tax benet does not exist, the aggregate capital structure would not signicantly
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change. This result stems from the assumption about rms' entry/exit. That is, without
rms' entry/exit as a standard dynamic trade o model, all rms would eventually use
100% equity by accumulating retained earnings; but with rms' entry/exit, young rms
always exist and use debt in the process of accumulating retained earnings. This result
implies that the wedge in equity funding caused by the dividend tax and the otation
cost of equity are also important determinant of capital structure. Second, the wedge in
equity nance caused by the dividend tax and the otation cost of equity have ambiguous
eects on leverage, which depend on the rm's nancial position and protability. That
is, with the wedge in equity funding, rich and big rms would decrease their leverage while
poor and small rms increase their leverage. Third, the default cost makes debt nance
very unattractive. This implies that it is important to model endogenous default when we
discuss corporate capital structure. Fourth, the tax disbenet coming from the gap between
i and 
l
c also makes rms prefer equity to debt. This implies that the progressive tax rate
system for the corporate income tax signicantly aects corporate capital structure. Fifth,
the investment irreversibility magnies the unattractiveness of debt, but it would have no
eect on leverage if the wedge in equity nance does not exist.
5.3 Aggregate Eects of Tax Cut and Default Cost
In this subsection, I measure the eect of the corporate income tax and the default cost on
aggregate variables such as output, investment, and consumption. The policy experiments
to measure the eects of the corporate income tax and the default cost are not new, but
it is worthwhile to analyze their eect under the endogenous corporate capital structure
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choice.
5.3.1 Corporate Income Tax Rate
A corporate income tax cut is an interesting policy experiment using this model because
incorporating the corporate income tax into macroeconomic models is not easy task. For
example, since the corporate income is always zero in a standard neoclassical growth model,
it is impossible to discuss the eect of corporate income tax. Even if the corporate income
is not zero, the dierence between debt and equity nance must be modelled to separately
discuss the corporate income tax and the dividend tax.4
Table 5.4 shows the result of a tax cut in the corporate income tax rate. If the corporate
income tax rate is decreased from 35% to 28%, the aggregate variables would increase so
much. The output, productivity, consumption and capital would increase by 6.0%, 4.3%,
4.8% and 12.2%, respectively. Note that the growth of capital is pretty large compared with
other variables. This implies that the corporate income tax is a kind of capital taxation
and strongly depresses corporate investment.
This strong response of investment to the corporate income tax is one of reasons why the
rm's leverage does not signicantly decrease when the tax benet is eliminated. That is,
the strong growth in investment expands the nancing decit and increases their leverage
because the gap is usually nanced by debt.
4McGrattan and Prescott (2005) distinguish the corporate income tax from the dividend tax by dividing
the rm's capital into a tangible and an intangible one.
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Table 5.4: Changes in Aggregate Variables
c : 0:35! 0:28  : 0:07! 0:00
Output + 6.0% + 0.7%
Productivity + 4.3% + 0.3%
Consumption + 4.8% + 0.4%
Capital + 12.2% + 2.2%
5.3.2 Default Cost
Macroeconomic eects of the default cost are emphasized in many papers. In particular,
business cycle models with nancial frictions use the default cost as a source of the nancial
acceleration.5 Since there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model, it is dicult to directly
compare the result in this paper with that in those papers, but it is still worthwhile to
measure the eect of the default cost on the steady state values of aggregate variables.
Table 5.4 shows the eect of the elimination of the default cost. If the default cost
is completely eliminated, i.e.,  = 0, the output, productivity, consumption and capital
would increase by 0.7%, 0.3%, 0.4% and 2.2%, respectively. Even though the elimination
of the default cost increase the aggregate variables, its magnitude is surprisingly small.
The logic behind the very small eect of the default cost on the aggregate variables is
as follows. As the policy function of asset in Figure 4.3 shows, the optimal asset size barely
depends on the amount of equity. It implies that even if the rm does not have enough
net worth, they would be able to access to debt or outside equity and do not decrease the
investment. Therefore, the default cost aects the rm's capital structure a lot, but do
not change the amount of investment. This implies that the eect of the default cost on
5For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) uses the default cost as the only source of nancial
acceleration. If there is no default cost in their model, the spread would disappear and, as a result, the
acceleration would not exist in their model.
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aggregate variables may be overstated in the previous literature. That is, the eect might
not be so large if rms can change their leverage freely.6
6Note that this model is calibrated by the values of listed rms. Since the listed rms are usually rich
and big rms, the eect of the default cost on relatively small rms may be overlooked in this model.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a structural model based on the dynamic trade o theory and
investigate the logic behind cross sectional dispersion of leverage. Unlike other related
works, since the model is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
rms and their endogenous entry/exit, I get not only a certain rm's optimal policy but
also an equilibrium distribution regarding a rm's characteristics. Also, I incorporate
economies of scale and two types of productivities (persistent and transitory). They are
common features in other literatures, but they have not been considered in the capital
structure literature.
The main ndings are summarized as follows. First, I nd that the equilibrium dis-
tribution accounts for the dispersion of capital structure in data. Second, I nd that it
also accounts for the relationship of capital structure to protability and rm size. The
key mechanisms to achieve the relationships are the dierence in responses to persistent
and transitory productivity shocks and economies of scale. Third, I quantify the relative
importance between determinants of the rm's capital structure through counterfactual
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experiments. The result of the experiments implies that, among others, even if the tax
benet does not exist, the rm would continue to use substantial amount of debt in contrast
to previous works. The logic behind the result is that because rms' entry/exit actively
occurs even in a stationary equilibrium, young rms always exist and use debt until they
accumulate enough internal funding. Fourth, the elimination of the default cost does not
have large eect on aggregate variables such as output, investment, and consumption. This
implies that we have to consider the eect more conservatively.
As future works, it is an interesting extension to incorporate an aggregate uncertainty
into the model and account for the capital structure behavior over business cycles. Chugh
(2010) describes some interesting stylized facts. Also Jermann and Quadrini (2010) argues
that corporate capital structure may play an important role to explain business cycle
uctuations using more parsimonious model. Incorporating an aggregate uncertainty into
this model may give more micro-founded description about the role of corporate capital
structure over business cycles.
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Appendix A
Algorithm to Compute a
Stationary Equilibrium
In this subsection, I briey explain about the numerical algorithm that I use to compute the
stationary equilibrium. As I mentioned, I set w = 1:0 and Ls = 0:6 in the baseline model
as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). The basic algorithm to compute the stationary
equilibrium in the baseline model is as follows.
1. Solve the Bellman equations for each rm under w = 1:0.
2. By the free entry condition, set ce =
R
V (0; z)d(z).
3. Calculate the stationary distribution.
4. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor
supply Ls. Set the mass of entrants M so that the aggregate labor supply is equal
to 0.6.
5. Using this mass of the new entrants M and the stationary distribution, we can
calculate the aggregate consumption C. Then, set A so that the rst order condition
of the households is satised.
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Appendix B
Algorithm for Numerical
Experiment
1. Guess the equilibrium wage w.
2. Solve the Bellman equations for each rm under w.
3. Compare ce and
R
V (0; z)d(z). If the entry cost is equal to the value for the entrants
(i.e., the free entry condition holds), go to the next step. If not, adjust w and go
back to the previous step.
4. Calculate the stationary distribution.
5. Using the stationary distribution, we can calculate the equilibrium aggregate labor
supply Ls and aggregate consumption C. Set the mass of entrants M so that the
rst order condition of the households is satised.
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Appendix C
Data
I use COMPUSTAT data in recent ten years (1988 - 2008). As other papers using this data
set do, I drop some data based on the following criteria. First, I drop rms in nancial
sector and regulated industries because the capital structure in those industries is quite
dierent from other industries.1 I drop observations from the data set if their SIC code is
from 4900 to 4999 or from 6000 to 6999. Second, I drop the observations if the number of
employees, the book asset, the book equity, or book debt is zero or negative.
I use the rm's ROA as a proxy for its protability. ROA in this paper is dened as:
Operating Income Before Depreciation (item 13)
Assets (item 6)
In the previous papers, some denitions of the rm's leverage are proposed. Among them,
I adopt the following denition:
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34)+ Long-Term Debt (item 9)
Debt in Current Liabilities (item 34)+ Long Term Debt (item 9)+ Stockholders Equity (item 216)
Rajan and Zingales (1995) examines several denitions of leverage, and discusses advan-
tages and disadvantages of each denition. Then, they argue that the denition which I
adopt in this paper is closest to the one supposed in the economic model. See Rajan and
Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) for more detail about the denitions.
1Chapter 2 of Tirole (2006) reviews these dierences. Also, Adrian and Shin (2008) shows that nancial
institutions' behavior to the leverage ratio is quite dierent from that of non-nancial corporations.
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